Optimal Taxes and Transfers in a Multilevel Public Sector
This paper analyzes taxes and transfers in an economy with three distinct levels of government. It is assumed that the different levels of government raise revenue through distortionary income taxation, resulting in vertical fiscal externalities. We show how to implement a socially optimal resource allocation when (i) the different levels of government act as Nash competitors to one another, and (ii) when one or several of the governmental entities act as Stackelberg leaders.
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Volume (Year): 58 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2 (February)
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