Experimental investigation of stationary concepts in cyclic duopoly games
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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-009-9218-8
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Cited by:
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- Chmura, Thorsten & Goerg, Sebastian J. & Selten, Reinhard, 2008. "Learning in experimental 2×2 games," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 18/2008, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
- Thorsten Chmura & Sebastian Goerg & Reinhard Selten, 2011. "Learning in experimental 2 x 2 games," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2011_26, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Sebastian J. Goerg & Tibor Neugebauer & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 2016.
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- Goerg Sebastian J. & Sadrieh Abdolkarim & Neugebauer Tibor, 2016. "Impulse Response Dynamics in Weakest Link Games," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 17(3), pages 284-297, August.
- Thorsten Chmura & Werner Güth, 2011.
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- Thorsten Chmura & Werner Güth & Thomas Pitz & Anthony Ziegelmeyer, 2010. "The Minority of Three-Game: An Experimental and Theoretical Analysis," Jena Economics Research Papers 2010-071, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
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More about this item
Keywords
Cyclic game duopoly experiment; Impulse-balance equilibrium; Payoff-sampling equilibrium; C73; D43; C90;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
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