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Political Competition, Rent Seeking and the Choice of Environmental Policy Instruments: Comment

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  • Bouwe Dijkstra

Abstract

In this comment, I analyze Damania's political economy model (Environmental and Resource Economics 13: 415–433, 1999), correcting some flaws and clarifying some ambiguities. I arguethat the political parties are identical at the outset of the game. Onlyafter the parties have chosen the instrument (standards or taxation) and thestrictness of environmental policy do the environmentalists and thepolluting firms know which party to support in the election campaign. Inequilibrium, both parties choose the same platform, so that both have anequal probability of winning the election. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

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  • Bouwe Dijkstra, 2004. "Political Competition, Rent Seeking and the Choice of Environmental Policy Instruments: Comment," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 29(1), pages 39-56, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:29:y:2004:i:1:p:39-56
    DOI: 10.1023/B:EARE.0000035439.63411.68
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bouwe R. Dijkstra, 1999. "The Political Economy of Environmental Policy," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1636.
    2. Dijkstra, Bouwe R., 1998. "A two-stage rent-seeking contest for instrument choice and revenue division, applied to environmental policy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 281-301, May.
    3. R. Damania, 1999. "Political Competition, Rent Seeking and the Choice of Environmental Policy Instruments," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 13(4), pages 415-433, June.
    4. Dijkstra, Bouwe R., 1998. "Cooperation by way of support in a rent seeking contest for a public good," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 703-725, November.
    5. Hillman, Arye L & Ursprung, Heinrich W, 1988. "Domestic Politics, Foreign Interests, and International Trade Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 719-745, September.
    6. Hofer, Tracy & Woodruff, Chris, 1994. "Domestic Politics, Foreign Interests, and International Trade Policy: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(5), pages 1474-1475, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Pani, Marco & Perroni, Carlo, 2018. "Energy subsidies and policy commitment in political equilibrium," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 149-160.
    2. Daniel Cardona & Jenny De Freitas & Antoni Rubí-Barceló, 2021. "Environmental policy contests: command and control versus taxes," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 28(3), pages 654-684, June.

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