Political Competition, Rent Seeking and the Choice of Environmental Policy Instruments: Comment
In this comment, I analyze Damania's political economy model (Environmental and Resource Economics 13: 415–433, 1999), correcting some flaws and clarifying some ambiguities. I arguethat the political parties are identical at the outset of the game. Onlyafter the parties have chosen the instrument (standards or taxation) and thestrictness of environmental policy do the environmentalists and thepolluting firms know which party to support in the election campaign. Inequilibrium, both parties choose the same platform, so that both have anequal probability of winning the election. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004
Volume (Year): 29 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (September)
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- Hillman, Arye L & Ursprung, Heinrich W, 1988. "Domestic Politics, Foreign Interests, and International Trade Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 719-45, September.
- Dijkstra, Bouwe R., 1998. "Cooperation by way of support in a rent seeking contest for a public good," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 703-725, November.
- Hofer, Tracy & Woodruff, Chris, 1994. "Domestic Politics, Foreign Interests, and International Trade Policy: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(5), pages 1474-75, December.
- R. Damania, 1999. "Political Competition, Rent Seeking and the Choice of Environmental Policy Instruments," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 13(4), pages 415-433, June.
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