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Economic origins of the no-fault divorce revolution

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  • Peter T. Leeson

    (George Mason University)

  • Joshua Pierson

    (George Mason University)

Abstract

Richard Posner argues that late twentieth-century divorce-law reform rendered marital relationships in the United States increasingly contractual in nature. Chief among such reforms was the no-fault divorce revolution: the widespread switch in states’ legal regimes from fault-based, mutual-consent divorce to no-fault based, unilateral divorce, which swept across America in the 1970s. While a growing literature considers the no-fault divorce revolution’s effects on divorce rates, almost no work considers its causes. Taking Posner’s observation as its starting point, this paper develops testable hypotheses relating to the potential origins of no-fault divorce reforms in the US.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter T. Leeson & Joshua Pierson, 2017. "Economic origins of the no-fault divorce revolution," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 43(3), pages 419-439, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:43:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s10657-015-9501-4
    DOI: 10.1007/s10657-015-9501-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Siwan Anderson & Chris Bidner, 2021. "An Institutional Perspective on the Economics of the Family," Discussion Papers dp21-14, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
    2. Peter T. Leeson & Joshua Pierson, 2016. "Prenups," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(2), pages 367-400.
    3. Clara E. Piano, 2022. "The family and the state: a public choice perspective," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 35(3), pages 383-405, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    No-fault divorce; Unilateral divorce; Divorce; Richard Posner;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K36 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Family and Personal Law
    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure

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