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No conflict, no interest: on the economics of conflicts of interest faced by analysts

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  • William Forbes

Abstract

This paper outlines evolution of the policy response to conflicts of interest analysts face in offering investment advice to investors when the company they follow may also buy merchant banking services from their employer. Both in the US and the UK on a both statutory and common law basis the response has been one of to disclose and let market participants price the implied conflict or simply rebut the advice given. An efficient market can price conflicts and by implication unravel any potential damage to shareholder wealth induced by analysts’ conflicts of interests in this view. I consider the impact the presence of “noise traders” in financial markets may have on the welfare implications of this sort of policy stance. The presence of noise traders casts doubt on the benign impact of conflicts of interest in financial markets. In particular the presence of noise induced variance in analyst’s forecasts implies disclosure based remedies may be ineffective in mitigating the harm of analyst’s conflicts of interest. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013

Suggested Citation

  • William Forbes, 2013. "No conflict, no interest: on the economics of conflicts of interest faced by analysts," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 327-348, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:35:y:2013:i:3:p:327-348
    DOI: 10.1007/s10657-011-9284-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Riccardo Ferretti & Pierpaolo Pattitoni & Anna Salinas, 2015. "The effectiveness of insider trading regulations: The case of the Italian tender offers," Centro Studi di Banca e Finanza (CEFIN) (Center for Studies in Banking and Finance) 0057, Universita di Modena e Reggio Emilia, Dipartimento di Economia "Marco Biagi".
    2. Riccardo Ferretti & Pierpaolo Pattitoni & Anna Salinas, 2015. "The effectiveness of insider trading regulations: The case of the Italian tender offers," Centro Studi di Banca e Finanza (CEFIN) (Center for Studies in Banking and Finance) 15309, Universita di Modena e Reggio Emilia, Dipartimento di Economia "Marco Biagi".
    3. R. Ferretti & P. Pattitoni & R. Patuelli, 2016. "Market Abuse Directive and Insider Trading: Evidence from Italian Tender Offers," Working Papers wp1071, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    4. Yen-Jung Tseng & Mark Wilson, 2020. "Changes in Recommendation Rating Systems, Analyst Optimism, and Investor Response," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 166(2), pages 369-401, October.
    5. Riccardo Ferretti & Pierpaolo Pattitoni & Roberto Patuelli, 2021. "Insider Trading and the Market Abuse Directive: Are Voluntary and Mandatory Takeover Bids Different?," Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, Springer;Società Italiana degli Economisti (Italian Economic Association), vol. 7(3), pages 461-485, November.
    6. Haozhi Huang & Mingsheng Li & Jing Shi, 2020. "Should Financial Gatekeepers be Publicly Traded?," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 164(1), pages 175-200, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Conflicts of interest; Analysts; Market abuse directive; G21; G24; G38; K22;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law

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