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The Deterrent Effect of UK Competition Enforcement

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  • Fiammetta Gordon
  • David Squires

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Fiammetta Gordon & David Squires, 2008. "The Deterrent Effect of UK Competition Enforcement," De Economist, Springer, vol. 156(4), pages 411-432, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:decono:v:156:y:2008:i:4:p:411-432
    DOI: 10.1007/s10645-008-9102-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dennis W. Carlton, 2007. "Does Antitrust Need to be Modernized?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 21(3), pages 155-176, Summer.
    2. Ken Heyer, 2006. "Welfare Standards and Merger Analysis: Why Not the Best?," CPI Journal, Competition Policy International, vol. 2.
    3. Robert M. Feinberg, 1985. "The Enforcement and Effects of European Competition Policy: Results of a Survey of Legal Opinion," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(4), pages 373-384, June.
    4. Motta,Massimo, 2004. "Competition Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521016919, September.
    5. Souam, Said, 2001. "Optimal antitrust policy under different regimes of fines," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(1-2), pages 1-26, January.
    6. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Kenneth Heyer, 2006. "Welfare Standards and Merger Analysis: Why not the Best?," EAG Discussions Papers 200608, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division.
    8. Farrell, Joseph & Katz, Michael L, 2006. "The Economics of Welfare Standards in Antitrust," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series qt1tw2d426, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    9. repec:esx:essedp:511 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Frezal, Sylvestre, 2006. "On optimal cartel deterrence policies," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 1231-1240, November.
    11. Symeonidis, George, 2000. "Are cartel laws bad for business? Evidence from the UK," Economics Discussion Papers 3696, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
    12. Melinda Acutt & Caroline Elliott, 2001. "Threat-Based Competition Policy," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 309-317, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Gunnar Niels & Reinder Dijk, 2008. "Competition Policy: What are the Costs and Benefits of Measuring its Costs and Benefits?," De Economist, Springer, vol. 156(4), pages 349-364, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    competition enforcement; consumer savings; deterrent effect; merger control; K21; L4;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies

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