Energy Efficiency: Efficiency or Monopsony?
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- Brennan, Timothy J., 2010.
"Optimal energy efficiency policies and regulatory demand-side management tests: How well do they match?,"
Elsevier, vol. 38(8), pages 3874-3885, August.
- Timothy J. Brennan, 2009. "Optimal Energy Efficiency Policies and Regulatory Demand-Side Management Tests: How Well Do They Match?," UMBC Economics Department Working Papers 09-109, UMBC Department of Economics, revised 01 Jan 2009.
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More about this item
Keywordsenergy efficiency; monopsony; consumer welfare; total welfare; electricity;
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
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