IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/copoec/v22y2011i4p355-372.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Decentralization, agency costs, and the new economic constitution of China

Author

Listed:
  • Eric Ip

    ()

  • Michael Law

    ()

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Eric Ip & Michael Law, 2011. "Decentralization, agency costs, and the new economic constitution of China," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 22(4), pages 355-372, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:22:y:2011:i:4:p:355-372 DOI: 10.1007/s10602-011-9110-3
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10602-011-9110-3
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Douglass C. North, 1990. "A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 2(4), pages 355-367, October.
    2. Erik Wibbels, 2005. "Decentralized Governance, Constitution Formation, and Redistribution," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 161-188, June.
    3. Zhang, Xiaobo, 2006. "Fiscal decentralization and political centralization in China: Implications for growth and inequality," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, pages 713-726.
    4. C. Fred Bergsten & Charles Freeman & Nicholas R. Lardy, 2009. "China's Rise: Challenges and Opportunities," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 4341.
    5. Tom Ginsburg, 2002. "Comparative Administrative Procedure: Evidence from Northeast Asia," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 247-264, September.
    6. Linda Yueh, 2010. "The Economy of China," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 3705, April.
    7. Roger Congleton & Andreas Kyriacou & Jordi Bacaria, 2003. "A Theory of Menu Federalism: Decentralization by Political Agreement," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 167-190, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Mel Marquis, 2013. "Abuse of administrative power to restrict competition in China: four reflections, two ideas and a thought," Chapters,in: The Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law, chapter 2, pages 73-141 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Hong Zhu & Qi Zhu, 2016. "Mergers and acquisitions by Chinese firms: A review and comparison with other mergers and acquisitions research in the leading journals," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 1107-1149, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    China; Decentralization; Administrative monopoly; Agency costs; Economic constitution; Anti-Monopoly Law; D73; D78; K21;

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:22:y:2011:i:4:p:355-372. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.