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How Would Bilateral Trade Retaliation Affect China?

Listed author(s):
  • Chunding Li

    ()

    (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
    Western University
    Central University of Finance and Economics)

Registered author(s):

    Abstract China is a large trade surplus country and could potentially become involved in bilateral trade retaliation. This paper uses a numerical simulation method to empirically explore how Chinese involvement in bilateral trade retaliation could affect both China and other countries. We analyze four different country groupings using scenario solutions of numerical global general equilibrium models to simulate trade retaliation equilibria and calculate their impacts. Our simulation results suggest that China will be hurt by trade retaliation sequences with other countries, but impacts depend on who is involved. Trade retaliation with large countries and major trade partners will hurt China more.

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    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10614-016-9571-6
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    Article provided by Springer & Society for Computational Economics in its journal Computational Economics.

    Volume (Year): 49 (2017)
    Issue (Month): 3 (March)
    Pages: 459-479

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    Handle: RePEc:kap:compec:v:49:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s10614-016-9571-6
    DOI: 10.1007/s10614-016-9571-6
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