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The Case Against a U.S.-Arms Monopoly

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  • Christopher Coyne
  • Abigail Hall

Abstract

The U.S. government is the dominant player in the global arms market. Existing literature emphasizes the many benefits of an international U.S. government arms monopoly including: regional and global balance, stability and security, the advancement of U.S. national interests, and domestic economic benefits from international sales. The purpose of this paper is to balance this largely one-sided treatment of the U.S. government’s dominant position in the international arms market. We discuss several negative consequences and costs associated with U.S. arms sales which call into question the net benefit of the U.S. government’s control over global arms. Copyright International Atlantic Economic Society 2014

Suggested Citation

  • Christopher Coyne & Abigail Hall, 2014. "The Case Against a U.S.-Arms Monopoly," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 42(2), pages 181-190, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:atlecj:v:42:y:2014:i:2:p:181-190
    DOI: 10.1007/s11293-014-9414-6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Anderton, Charles H., 1995. "Economics of arms trade," Handbook of Defense Economics, in: Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), Handbook of Defense Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 18, pages 523-561, Elsevier.
    2. Thomas Duncan & Christopher Coyne, 2013. "The overlooked costs of the permanent war economy: A market process approach," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 26(4), pages 413-431, December.
    3. Stephen G. Brooks, 2007. "Introduction to Producing Security: Multinational Corporations, Globalization, and the Changing Calculus of Conflict," Introductory Chapters, in: Producing Security: Multinational Corporations, Globalization, and the Changing Calculus of Conflict, Princeton University Press.
    4. Dunne, J. Paul, 1995. "The defense industrial base," Handbook of Defense Economics, in: Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), Handbook of Defense Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 14, pages 399-430, Elsevier.
    5. Christopher Coyne & Russell Sobel & John Dove, 2010. "The non-productive entrepreneurial process," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 23(4), pages 333-346, December.
    6. Christopher J. Coyne & Peter T. Leeson, 2004. "The Plight of Underdeveloped Countries," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 24(3), pages 235-249, Fall.
    7. Sandler,Todd & Hartley,Keith, 1995. "The Economics of Defense," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521447287.
    8. Christopher J. Coyne & Rachel L. Mathers (ed.), 2011. "The Handbook on the Political Economy of War," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 13385.
    9. Christopher J. Coyne & Adam Pellillo, 2011. "Economic reconstruction amidst conflict: Insights from Afghanistan and Iraq," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(6), pages 627-643, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Coyne,Christopher J., 2020. "Defense, Peace, and War Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108724036.
    2. Christopher Coyne, 2015. "Lobotomizing the defense brain," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 28(4), pages 371-396, December.
    3. Alshamy, Yahya & Coyne, Christopher J. & Goodman, Nathan, 2023. "Noxious government markets: Evidence from the international arms trade," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 205(C), pages 87-99.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Arms sales; Foreign policy; Monopoly; System effects; D42; D74; F51; F52; H12; H56;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
    • F52 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - National Security; Economic Nationalism
    • H12 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Crisis Management
    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War

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