Basel II and Bankers’ Propensity to Take or Avoid Excessive Risk
Both Basel I and Basel II are concerned (indeed, obsessed) with risk taking by bankers. But risk is an essential part of banking. The essential issues are “when are such risks excessive and does Basel II effectively constrain bankers from taking excessive risks?” I answer these questions by outlining alternative definitions of excessive risk and analyzing the extent to which Basel II deals effectively with this risk. I find the Basel II measures both costly and inadequate, and likely increase excessive risk taking. I conclude with a preferable alternative procedure – including subordinated debt fully in required capital and prompt corrective action based on prestructured capital/asset ratios. Copyright International Atlantic Economic Society 2007
Volume (Year): 35 (2007)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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- Carolyn Currie, 2006.
"A Test Of The Strategic Effect Of Basel Ii Operational Risk Requirements On Banks,"
The IUP Journal of Monetary Economics,
IUP Publications, vol. 0(4), pages 6-28, November.
- Carolyn Currie, 2005. "A Test of the Strategic Effect of Basel II Operational Risk Requirements on Banks," Working Paper Series 141, Finance Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney.
- Carolyn Currie, 2005. "A Test of the Strategic Effect of Basel II Operational Risk Requirements on Banks," Working Paper Series 143, Finance Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney.
- George J. Benston & George G. Kaufman, 1988. "Risk and solvency regulation of depository institutions: past policies and current options," Staff Memoranda 88-1, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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