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The Gatekeeper Effect: The Implications of Pre-Screening, Self-Selection, and Bias for Hiring Processes

Author

Listed:
  • Moran Koren

    (Department of Industrial Engineering and Management, Ben Gurion University of the Negev, Beer Sheva 84105, Israel)

Abstract

We study the problem of screening in decision-making processes under uncertainty, while focusing on the impact of adding an additional screening stage, commonly known as a “gatekeeper.” Although our main analysis is rooted in the context of job market hiring, the principles and findings are broadly applicable to areas such as educational admissions, patient healthcare selection, and financial loan approvals. The gatekeeper’s role is to assess applicant suitability before significant costs are incurred. Our study reveals that although gatekeepers are designed to streamline selection processes by filtering out the candidates who are less likely to be selected, sometimes they inadvertently affect the candidate’s own decision-making process. We explore the conditions under which the introduction of a gatekeeper can enhance or impede the efficiency of these processes. Additionally, we consider how gatekeeping strategies can be adapted to influence the accuracy of selection decisions. Our research also extends to scenarios in which gatekeeping is influenced by historical biases, particularly in competitive settings like hiring. We discover that candidates confronted with a statistically biased gatekeeping process are more likely to withdraw from the job application process, thereby perpetuating the previously mentioned historical biases. The study suggests that measures such as affirmative action can effectively address these biases. Although centered on hiring, the insights and methodologies from our study have significant implications for a wide range of fields to which screening and gatekeeping are integral.

Suggested Citation

  • Moran Koren, 2026. "The Gatekeeper Effect: The Implications of Pre-Screening, Self-Selection, and Bias for Hiring Processes," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 72(1), pages 426-441, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:72:y:2026:i:1:p:426-441
    DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2021.03918
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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