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Paying for Performance in Public Pension Plans

Author

Listed:
  • Yan Lu

    (College of Business Administration, University of Central Florida, Orlando, Florida 32827)

  • Kevin Mullally

    (College of Business Administration, University of Central Florida, Orlando, Florida 32827)

  • Sugata Ray

    (Culverhouse College of Business, University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, Alabama 34587)

Abstract

We examine the relation between public pension plan chief investment officer (CIO) compensation and plans’ investment performance. Higher paid CIOs outperform their counterparts by 47–60 basis points per year, largely through increased and superior investment in private equity and real estate. This outperformance generates an additional $74.91–$95.63 million in economic value. Plans offering higher compensation hire better educated CIOs and are more likely to retain their CIOs. Higher CIO compensation is positively correlated with the use of incentive compensation, but incentive compensation does not directly affect performance. Demand- and supply-side frictions help explain the variation in CIO pay and the persistent low compensation paid by some plans despite the positive relation between compensation and performance.

Suggested Citation

  • Yan Lu & Kevin Mullally & Sugata Ray, 2023. "Paying for Performance in Public Pension Plans," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(8), pages 4888-4907, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:69:y:2023:i:8:p:4888-4907
    DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4554
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