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An Experimental Study of Buyer-Seller Negotiation with One-Sided Incomplete Information and Time Discounting

Author

Listed:
  • Amnon Rapoport

    (University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona 85721)

  • Ido Erev

    (Technion-Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa 32000, Israel)

  • Rami Zwick

    (The University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand)

Abstract

We study a multiperiod bargaining mechanism in which a seller negotiates with a buyer over the price of an indivisible good. It is common knowledge that the good has zero value to the seller. Its value to the buyer is privately known, distributed independently of the seller's value according to a distribution that is common knowledge. Bargaining proceeds as follows. The seller sets a price and offers the buyer an opportunity to purchase the good. The buyer either waits for at least one more period or agrees to purchase the good at the given price. If the buyer refuses the offer, then the process is repeated with seller making a new offer on the next period. Our findings reveal several behavioral regularities, which do not support the sequential equilibrium for this bargaining mechanism. In line with recent developments in behavioral decision theory and game theory, which assume bounded rationality, we find that subjects follow simple rules of thumb in choosing strategies, reflected in the behavioral consistencies observed in the study.

Suggested Citation

  • Amnon Rapoport & Ido Erev & Rami Zwick, 1995. "An Experimental Study of Buyer-Seller Negotiation with One-Sided Incomplete Information and Time Discounting," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 41(3), pages 377-394, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:41:y:1995:i:3:p:377-394
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    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.41.3.377
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Fildes, Robert & Lusk, Edward J, 1984. "The choice of a forecasting model," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 12(5), pages 427-435.
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    6. Armstrong, J. Scott & Collopy, Fred, 1992. "Error measures for generalizing about forecasting methods: Empirical comparisons," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 69-80, June.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Aradhna Krishna & M. Utku Ünver, 2008. "Research Note—Improving the Efficiency of Course Bidding at Business Schools: Field and Laboratory Studies," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 27(2), pages 262-282, 03-04.
    2. van Damme, E.E.C. & Larouche, P. & Müller, W., 2006. "Abuse of a Dominant Position : Cases and Experiments," Discussion Paper 2006-020, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
    3. Reynolds, Stanley S., 2001. "Multi-period bargaining: asymmetric information and risk aversion," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 309-315, September.
    4. Baron, David P. & Bowen, T. Renee & Nunnari, Salvatore, 2017. "Durable coalitions and communication: Public versus private negotiations," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 1-13.
    5. Madarász, Kristóf, 2015. "Bargaining under the Illusion of Transparency," CEPR Discussion Papers 10327, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Bayer, Ralph-C., 2010. "Intertemporal price discrimination and competition," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, pages 273-293.
    7. Sean P. Sullivan, 2016. "Why Wait to Settle? An Experimental Test of the Asymmetric-Information Hypothesis," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(3), pages 497-525.
    8. Arnaud De Bruyn & Gary E. Bolton, 2008. "Estimating the Influence of Fairness on Bargaining Behavior," Management Science, INFORMS, pages 1774-1791.
    9. Adrian Groot Ruiz & Theo Offerman & Sander Onderstal, 2014. "For those about to talk we salute you: an experimental study of credible deviations and ACDC," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 17(2), pages 173-199, June.
    10. Ghosh, Dipankar, 2000. "Complementary arrangements of organizational factors and outcomes of negotiated transfer price," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 25(7), pages 661-682, October.
    11. Rosato, Antonio, 2017. "Sequential negotiations with loss-averse buyers," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 290-304.
    12. Stahl, Dale O. & Haruvy, Ernan, 2008. "Subgame perfection in ultimatum bargaining trees," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 292-307, May.
    13. repec:pal:jorsoc:v:57:y:2006:i:9:d:10.1057_palgrave.jors.2602097 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Srivastava, Joydeep, 2001. "The Role of Inferences in Sequential Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information: Some Experimental Evidence," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 166-187, May.
    15. Adrian de Groot Ruiz & Theo Offerman & Sander Onderstal, 2011. "An Experimental Study of Credible Deviations and ACDC," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 11-153/1, Tinbergen Institute.

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