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When do central banks prefer to intervene secretly?


  • Montserrat Ferré

    (Department of Economics, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Spain)

  • Carolina Manzano


Central banks often intervene secretly in the foreign exchange market. This secrecy seems to be at odds with the signalling channel. In this article we will analyse when a central bank intervening in the foreign exchange rate market purely through the signalling channel would prefer to act secretly or publicly. By using a microstructure model, we will show that the consistency of the intervention with fundamentals, the volume of noise trading, the weight given to the effectiveness of intervention and the degree of superior information held by the central bank will influence the decision to intervene secretly or publicly. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Suggested Citation

  • Montserrat Ferré & Carolina Manzano, 2009. "When do central banks prefer to intervene secretly?," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 14(4), pages 378-393.
  • Handle: RePEc:ijf:ijfiec:v:14:y:2009:i:4:p:378-393 DOI: 10.1002/ijfe.375

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Ferré Carracedo, Montserrat & Manzano, Carolina, 2008. "Market effects of foreign exchange coordinated intervention," Working Papers 2072/5366, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    2. Kentaro Iwatsubo & Satoshi Kawanishi, 2011. "The Information Improving Channel of Exchange Rate Intervention: How Do Official Announcements Work?," Discussion Papers 1116, Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • F31 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Exchange
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading


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