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Can Auto Liability Insurance Purchases Signal Risk Attitude?

Author

Listed:
  • Chu-Shiu Li

    (Department of International Business, Asia University, Taiwan)

  • Sheng-Chang Peng

    (Department of Risk Management and Insurance, Feng Chia University, Taiwan)

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Chu-Shiu Li & Sheng-Chang Peng, 2011. "Can Auto Liability Insurance Purchases Signal Risk Attitude?," International Journal of Business and Economics, College of Business and College of Finance, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan, vol. 10(2), pages 159-164, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:ijb:journl:v:10:y:2011:i:2:p:159-164
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Puelz, Robert & Snow, Arthur, 1994. "Evidence on Adverse Selection: Equilibrium Signaling and Cross-Subsidization in the Insurance Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(2), pages 236-257, April.
    2. Alma Cohen & Liran Einav, 2007. "Estimating Risk Preferences from Deductible Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(3), pages 745-788, June.
    3. Georges Dionne & Christian Gourieroux & Charles Vanasse, 2001. "Testing for Evidence of Adverse Selection in the Automobile Insurance Market: A Comment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(2), pages 444-473, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    risk aversion; liability insurance; automobile insurance;

    JEL classification:

    • D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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