Determinantes políticos de las transferencias discrecionales: evidencia de la Provincia de Córdoba, Argentina
Este trabajo examina el impacto de la táctica política en la distribución de las transferencias de fondos discrecionales entre el gobierno provincial y los municipios. Se analizan las diferentes teorías basadas en modelos partidistas y no partidistas, contrastando las mismas empíricamente para los municipios de la provincia de Córdoba, en Argentina. Los resultados obtenidos permiten confirmar la existencia de factores políticos y económicos como determinantes de la asignación de las transferencias discrecionales y si bien ninguno de los modelos teóricos explicados se ven reflejados en sentido estricto, sí se observa una combinación entre ellos. This work examines the impact of political tactics in the distribution of the transfers of optional funds between a provincial government and its municipalities. The different theories based on partisan and non-partisan models are analyzed, contrasting them empirically for the municipalities of the province of Cordoba, in Argentina. The results obtained confirm the existence of economic and political factors as determinants of the assignment of optional transfers. Even though none of the theoretical models exposed are reflected in a strict sense, a combination of them is observed.
Volume (Year): XLIII (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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