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Failure of the Rational Expectation: Argumentation, Logic and Suggestions on Supply-Side Management

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  • Kang Jia
  • Qiaobin Feng
  • Jingchun Su

Abstract

Rational expectation is known as the sixth revolution in economics. Based on a brief review of rational expectation, this paper puts forward the proposition of failure of rational expectation. The so-called failure of rational expectation means that when the market entity predicts future events, it is impossible to form a completely accurate expectation and then adjust its actions accordingly due to incomplete information and other reasons. On the contrary, due to various irrational factors, the actions of the market entities based on individual ration sometimes may be mad and loss of control, producing devastating effects on the economic system. This paper expounds the concept and formation mechanism of the failure of rational expectation, and conducts a preliminary empirical analysis on this in combination with China’s economic practice. On this basis, it proposes that rational supply management, which the government can play a role in, should be combined to correct the failure of rational expectation and realize the dynamic balance and stability of the economic system.

Suggested Citation

  • Kang Jia & Qiaobin Feng & Jingchun Su, 2020. "Failure of the Rational Expectation: Argumentation, Logic and Suggestions on Supply-Side Management," International Business Research, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 13(1), pages 161-168, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:ibn:ibrjnl:v:13:y:2020:i:1:p:161-168
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    2. Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(4), pages 629-649.
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    JEL classification:

    • R00 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General - - - General
    • Z0 - Other Special Topics - - General

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