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Incremental Bilateral Preference Stable Planning over Event Based Social Networks

Author

Listed:
  • Boyang Li
  • Yurong Cheng
  • Guoren Wang
  • Yongjiao Sun

Abstract

In recent years, Event Based Social Networks (EBSNs) appear in people’s daily life and are becoming increasing popular. In EBSNs, one typical task is to make personalized plans for users. Existing studies only consider the preference of users. They make plans by selecting interesting events for users. However, for organizers of events, they also would like more high-quality users to participate in their events, which may make the events more exciting. Existing studies are user-centered and ignore the requirement of organizers. What is more, organizers are allowed to modify their events dynamically before they are held. The platforms should be able to dynamically adjust the schedules of users. Therefore, we identify a new Incremental Bilateral Preference Stable Planning (IBPSP) problem over EBSNs and propose several solutions to deal with different situations. We conduct extensive experiments to verify the efficiency and effectiveness of the proposed algorithms.

Suggested Citation

  • Boyang Li & Yurong Cheng & Guoren Wang & Yongjiao Sun, 2019. "Incremental Bilateral Preference Stable Planning over Event Based Social Networks," Complexity, Hindawi, vol. 2019, pages 1-12, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:hin:complx:1532013
    DOI: 10.1155/2019/1532013
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Alvin Roth, 2008. "Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(3), pages 537-569, March.
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