Research on the Cultivation of Sustainable Innovation Dynamics in Private Technology Enterprises Based on Tripartite Evolution Game in China

Against the backdrop of intensifying global technological competition and the deepening of the national innovation-driven strategy, private technology enterprises, as the core entities of technological innovation, have their sustainable innovation dynamics profoundly influenced by the strategic interactions among multiple parties such as the government, enterprises, and users. Based on evolutionary game theory, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving the government, private technology enterprises, and market users in the Chinese context. Through theoretical deduction and multi-scenario numerical simulation using Matlab, it systematically analyzes the logic of strategic choices and the laws of dynamic equilibrium of the three parties in the process of sustainable innovation. The research shows that the strategic evolution of multiple entities presents multiple equilibrium states. There exist critical thresholds for the intensity of policy support, the concentration of market competition, and users’ willingness to choose innovative products; beyond these thresholds, the marginal impact on sustainable innovation dynamics increases significantly. Further research finds that the government and enterprises need to compensate for the profit gap between users’ choice of innovative products and traditional products through a subsidy mechanism to form a positive cycle of “active innovation–market recognition–profit improvement”. This study enriches the theoretical system of multi-entity innovation dynamics by incorporating user behavior and provides a decision-making reference for optimizing innovation governance and fostering the development of sustainable innovation dynamics in private enterprises in China and other similar economies.