Evolutionary Game Analysis of Multi-Agent Synergistic Incentives Driving Green Energy Market Expansion

Achieving the construction sector’s dual carbon objectives necessitates scaling green energy adoption in new residential buildings. The current literature critically overlooks four unresolved problems: oversimplified penalty mechanisms, ignoring escalating regulatory costs; static subsidies misaligned with market maturity evolution; systematic exclusion of innovation feedback from energy suppliers; and underexplored behavioral evolution of building owners. This study establishes a government–suppliers–owners evolutionary game framework with dynamically calibrated policies, simulated using MATLAB multi-scenario analysis. Novel findings demonstrate: (1) A dual-threshold penalty effect where excessive fines diminish policy returns due to regulatory costs, requiring dynamic calibration distinct from fixed-penalty approaches; (2) Market-maturity-phased subsidies increasing owner adoption probability by 30% through staged progression; (3) Energy suppliers’ cost-reducing innovations as pivotal feedback drivers resolving coordination failures, overlooked in prior tripartite models; (4) Owners’ adoption motivation shifts from short-term economic incentives to environmentally driven decisions under policy guidance. The framework resolves these gaps through integrated dynamic mechanisms, providing policymakers with evidence-based regulatory thresholds, energy suppliers with cost-reduction targets, and academia with replicable modeling tools.