Optimal Governance for Post-Concession Logistics Infrastructure: A Comparative Study of Self-Operation vs. Delegation Under Information Asymmetry

Public–private partnership (PPP) logistics infrastructure projects have become increasingly prevalent globally. Consequently, the effective management of these projects as their concession periods expire presents a crucial challenge for governments, vital for the sustainable management of PPP logistics infrastructure. This study addresses this challenge by focusing on the pivotal post-concession decision: whether the government should self-operate the mature logistics infrastructure or re-delegate its management to a private entity. Our theoretical model, built on a principal–agent framework, first establishes a social welfare baseline under government self-operation and then analyzes delegated operation under symmetric information, identifying efficiency frontiers. Under symmetric information, we find that government self-operation is more advantageous when its own operational efficiency is sufficiently high, irrespective of the private enterprise’s efficiency; conversely, delegating to an efficient private enterprise is optimal only when government operational efficiency is low. We also demonstrate that if the government can directly specify the demand quantity and service level and delegates operation via a fixed fee, the enterprise can be incentivized to align with the social optimum. However, under asymmetric information, potential welfare gains from delegation are inevitably offset by informational rent and output distortion. We further uncover non-monotonic impacts of parameters like the proportion of low-cost firms on social welfare loss and demonstrate how information asymmetry can indirectly compromise the long-term resilience of the infrastructure. Ultimately, our work asserts that delegation is only superior if its potential efficiency gains sufficiently offset the inherent losses stemming from information asymmetry.