IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/gam/jsusta/v15y2023i11p8438-d1153193.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Does Supervision Down to the Countryside Level Benefit Rural Public Goods Supply? Evidence on the Extent of Households’ Satisfaction with Public Goods from 2005 to 2019

Author

Listed:
  • Suwen Zheng

    (China Academy for Rural Development, School of Public Affairs, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310058, China)

  • Chunhui Ye

    (China Academy for Rural Development, School of Public Affairs, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310058, China)

  • Yunli Bai

    (Institute of Geographic Sciences and Natural Resources Research, Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), Beijing 100101, China)

Abstract

This paper mainly studies the effect of village-level power supervision reform on the rural supply of public goods. In this paper, the panel data of 100 villages in five provinces of China from 2005 to 2019 are used to identify and analyze the impact of the supervision policy on the supply of rural public goods. The study adopted PSM-DID as the identification strategy to alleviate the endogenous problem of the model; it found that the supervision policy significantly improved the supply of public goods in villages, and increased the satisfaction of villagers with the village economic base and public social services. There is regional heterogeneity in the improvement effect of policy on public goods supply, which mainly reflects the regions with weak economic development. This policy mainly promotes the optimization of public goods supply by strengthening villagers’ public participation, and promoting the improvement of the current situation of public goods by restraining village cadres’ duty behaviors. It is also found that the coupling of clan power and village formal authority can inhibit the positive effects brought by the policy, and only in areas with strong clan power can the negative effects be mitigated. Moreover, there is an alternative relationship between the assessment pressure of village cadres and the supervision force sent to the countryside, which will form a situation of excessive supervision and inhibit the optimization of village public goods. The conclusion of this paper provides empirical support for the view that “top-down external institutional supervision and bottom-up internal democratic supervision should be effectively integrated” in the theory of village power supervision.

Suggested Citation

  • Suwen Zheng & Chunhui Ye & Yunli Bai, 2023. "Does Supervision Down to the Countryside Level Benefit Rural Public Goods Supply? Evidence on the Extent of Households’ Satisfaction with Public Goods from 2005 to 2019," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(11), pages 1-34, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:15:y:2023:i:11:p:8438-:d:1153193
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/15/11/8438/pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/15/11/8438/
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bebbington, Anthony & Dharmawan, Leni & Fahmi, Erwin & Guggenheim, Scott, 2006. "Local Capacity, Village Governance, and the Political Economy of Rural Development in Indonesia," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 34(11), pages 1958-1976, November.
    2. Esther Ann Bøler & Andreas Moxnes & Karen Helene Ulltveit-Moe, 2015. "R&D, International Sourcing, and the Joint Impact on Firm Performance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(12), pages 3704-3739, December.
    3. Luo, Renfu & Zhang, Linxiu & Huang, Jikun & Rozelle, Scott, 2007. "Elections, fiscal reform and public goods provision in rural China," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 583-611, September.
    4. Hauk, Esther & Oviedo, Mónica & Ramos, Xavier, 2022. "Perception of corruption and public support for redistribution in Latin America," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    5. Cook, Nathan J. & Wright, Glenn D. & Andersson, Krister P., 2017. "Local Politics of Forest Governance: Why NGO Support Can Reduce Local Government Responsiveness," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 203-214.
    6. Meng, Xiangyi & Zhang, Li, 2011. "Democratic participation, fiscal reform and local governance: Empirical evidence on Chinese villages," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 88-97, March.
    7. Alain de Janvry & Guojun He & Elisabeth Sadoulet & Shaoda Wang & Qiong Zhang, 2023. "Subjective Performance Evaluation, Influence Activities, and Bureaucratic Work Behavior: Evidence from China," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 113(3), pages 766-799, March.
    8. Timothy Besley & Rohini Pande & Lupin Rahman & Vijayendra Rao, 2004. "The Politics of Public Good Provision: Evidence from Indian Local Governments," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(2-3), pages 416-426, 04/05.
    9. Paniagua, Victoria, 2022. "When clients vote for brokers: How elections improve public goods provision in urban slums," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 158(C).
    10. Díaz-Cayeros, Alberto & Magaloni, Beatriz & Ruiz-Euler, Alexander, 2014. "Traditional Governance, Citizen Engagement, and Local Public Goods: Evidence from Mexico," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 80-93.
    11. Wang, Shuna & Yao, Yang, 2007. "Grassroots Democracy and Local Governance: Evidence from Rural China," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 35(10), pages 1635-1649, October.
    12. Xu, Yiqing & Yao, Yang, 2015. "Informal Institutions, Collective Action, and Public Investment in Rural China," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 109(2), pages 371-391, May.
    13. Beesley, Celeste & Hawkins, Darren, 2022. "Corruption, institutional trust and political engagement in Peru," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 151(C).
    14. Evans, David K. & Holtemeyer, Brian & Kosec, Katrina, 2019. "Cash transfers increase trust in local government," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 138-155.
    15. Shen, Yan & Yao, Yang, 2008. "Does grassroots democracy reduce income inequality in China?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(10-11), pages 2182-2198, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Cai, Meina & Sun, Xin, 2018. "Institutional bindingness, power structure, and land expropriation in China," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 172-186.
    2. Mu, Ren & Zhang, Xiaobo, 2011. "The role of elected and appointed village leaders in the allocation of public resources: Evidence from a low-income region in China," IFPRI discussion papers 1061, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    3. Zhang, Jing & Gan, Li & Xu, Lixin Colin & Yao, Yang, 2014. "Health shocks, village elections, and household income: Evidence from rural China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 155-168.
    4. Li, Shi & Vendryes, Thomas, 2018. "Real estate activity, democracy and land rights in rural China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 54-79.
    5. James Alm & Yongzheng Liu, 2014. "China's Tax-for-Fee Reform and Village Inequality," Oxford Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 42(1), pages 38-64, March.
    6. Jiangli Dou & Bing Ye, 2018. "Informal Institutions And Local Public Investments In Rural China," The Singapore Economic Review (SER), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 63(04), pages 899-916, September.
    7. Lu, Jie, 2015. "Varieties of Governance in China: Migration and Institutional Change in Chinese Villages," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199378746.
    8. Junxue Jia & Cong Qin & Yongzheng Liu, 2017. "Do Community-Based Development Projects Alleviate Poverty? Evidence from Rural China," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper1722, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    9. Mu, Ren & Zhang, Xiaobo, 2014. "Do elected leaders in a limited democracy have real power? Evidence from rural China," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 17-27.
    10. Jinrui Xi & Feng Wen, 2019. "Sustainable Rural Governance: How Rural Elections in China Lead to Long-Term Social Stability?," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(22), pages 1-13, November.
    11. Wong, Ho Lun & Wang, Yu & Luo, Renfu & Zhang, Linxiu & Rozelle, Scott, 2017. "Local governance and the quality of local infrastructure: Evidence from village road projects in rural China," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 119-132.
    12. Hoken, Hisatoshi, 2016. "Participation in farmer's cooperatives and its effects on agricultural incomes : evidence from vegetable-producing areas in China," IDE Discussion Papers 578, Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization(JETRO).
    13. He, Quqiong & Pan, Ying & Sarangi, Sudipta, 2018. "Lineage-based heterogeneity and cooperative behavior in rural China," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 248-269.
    14. Kahsay, Goytom Abraha & Medhin, Haileselassie, 2020. "Leader turnover and forest management outcomes: Micro-level evidence from Ethiopia," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
    15. Li Han, 2014. "Are elections in autocracies a curse for incumbents? Evidence from Chinese villages," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(1), pages 221-242, January.
    16. Qian, Nancy & Padró i Miquel, Gerard & Martinez-Bravo, Monica & Yao, Yang, 2012. "The Effects of Democratization on Public Goods and Redistribution: Evidence from China," CEPR Discussion Papers 8975, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    17. Cuicui Xiao & Jingbo Zhou & Xingxing Shen & Jonathan Cullen & Susie Dobson & Fanran Meng & Xiaoxia Wang, 2022. "Rural Living Environment Governance: A Survey and Comparison between Two Villages in Henan Province of China," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(21), pages 1-18, October.
    18. Liang, Pinghan & Xiao, Shukang, 2022. "Pray, vote, and money: The double-edged sword effect of religions on rural political participation in China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    19. Tao, Ran & Su, Fubing & Sun, Xin & Lu, Xi, 2011. "Political trust as rational belief: Evidence from Chinese village elections," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 108-121, March.
    20. Claudio A. Agostini & Philip Brown & Xiaobo Zhang, 2016. "Special Section: China's Growing Trade and its Role to the World Economy," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(1), pages 13-31, February.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:15:y:2023:i:11:p:8438-:d:1153193. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: MDPI Indexing Manager (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.mdpi.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.