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Research on the Effect of an Environmental Protection Tax Policy on Haze Control in China—Empirical Analysis Based on Provincial Panel Data

Author

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  • Xia Li

    (School of Economics and Management, Shanghai University of Political Science and Law, Shanghai 201701, China)

  • Guangyao Deng

    (School of Statistics, Lanzhou University of Finance and Economics, Lanzhou 730020, China)

Abstract

This paper describes the construction of a model to explore the effectiveness of environmental protection taxes on haze emission reduction in China. The model is based on panel data from 30 provinces and cities in China, from 2003–2019. It is found that the current environmental protection tax has a significant inhibitory effect on haze. In addition, an upfront pollutant discharge fee can guide enterprises to significantly reduce the emission of haze-causing pollutants. A robustness test is conducted, using the variable substitution method of taking sulfur dioxide (SO 2 ) as haze, and the research conclusions are consistent. We then put forward three specific suggestions: (1) Expand the scope of the environmental protection tax, gradually increase the tax rate, or adopt an excessive progressive tax rate. For example, China could consider including mobile pollution sources into the scope of taxation. (2) Increase the supervision and collection of the environmental protection tax. (3) Strengthen the multiple linkages between regional taxation departments and environmental protection departments, in order to form a collaboration between the departments in an effort to control haze and promote the sustainable development of the Chinese economy and the environment.

Suggested Citation

  • Xia Li & Guangyao Deng, 2021. "Research on the Effect of an Environmental Protection Tax Policy on Haze Control in China—Empirical Analysis Based on Provincial Panel Data," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(1), pages 1-12, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:14:y:2021:i:1:p:41-:d:707728
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    References listed on IDEAS

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