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Drivers’ Skills and Behavior vs. Traffic at Intersections

Author

Listed:
  • Krzysztof J. Szajowski

    (Faculty of Pure and Applied Mathematics, Wroclaw University of Science and Technology, Wybrzeze Wyspianskiego 27, PL-50-370 Wroclaw, Poland
    These authors contributed equally to this work.)

  • Kinga Włodarczyk

    (Faculty of Pure and Applied Mathematics, Wroclaw University of Science and Technology, Wybrzeze Wyspianskiego 27, PL-50-370 Wroclaw, Poland
    These authors contributed equally to this work.)

Abstract

The aim of the work is to connect individual behavior of drivers with traffic intensity. By diversifying the populations of drivers into two categories, often considered in this type of an analysis, CO (cooperative) and DE (defective), the tendency of drivers from each of these groups to deviate from compliance with traffic rules is established. The effective driver behavior translates into disrupting traffic by slowing it down. Participant interactions are described using game theories that provide information for simulations algorithms based on cellular automata. Three different ways of using this combination of descriptions of traffic participants to examine the impact of their behavior on the traffic dynamics are shown. Directions of the further, detailed analysis are indicated, which requires basic research in the field of game theory models.

Suggested Citation

  • Krzysztof J. Szajowski & Kinga Włodarczyk, 2020. "Drivers’ Skills and Behavior vs. Traffic at Intersections," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 8(3), pages 1-20, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jmathe:v:8:y:2020:i:3:p:433-:d:333236
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    References listed on IDEAS

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