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Gender Power, the Top Management Team, and Firm Credit Default Risk

Author

Listed:
  • Mark A. Tribbitt

    (Department of Strategy, Pepperdine Graziadio Business School, Pepperdine University, Malibu, CA 90263, USA)

  • Richard Walton

    (Department of Finance, Pepperdine Graziadio Business School, Pepperdine University, Malibu, CA 90263, USA)

Abstract

This paper considers the impact of the composition of the top management team on the credit default risk of the firm. Finance theory suggests that shareholders prefer higher levels of risk than the risk-averse executives managing the firm. Increasing the influence of female executives may reduce credit default risk, as female executives have been shown to be associated with lower firm risk. Alternatively, as diversity has been shown to improve the quality of group decision-making, a higher but optimal credit default risk may result. This paper uses a matched sample of 6,652 firm-year observations of publicly traded American firms over the period 2010–2020 to investigate the relationship between gender power within the top management team and credit default risk as measured by the Altman Z-score. This paper finds a convex relationship between the Altman Z-score and the influence of female executives. In other words, top management teams where power is shared between female and male executives accept higher levels of credit default risk than teams dominated by just female (or just male) executives. However, this paper also finds that an excessively high credit risk is negatively associated with the influence of female executives.

Suggested Citation

  • Mark A. Tribbitt & Richard Walton, 2024. "Gender Power, the Top Management Team, and Firm Credit Default Risk," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 17(8), pages 1-16, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jjrfmx:v:17:y:2024:i:8:p:368-:d:1458864
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    3. Almaskati, Nawaf & Bird, Ron & Yeung, Danny & Lu, Yue, 2021. "A horse race of models and estimation methods for predicting bankruptcy," Advances in accounting, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).
    4. Lurdes Patrício & Mário Franco, 2022. "A Systematic Literature Review about Team Diversity and Team Performance: Future Lines of Investigation," Administrative Sciences, MDPI, vol. 12(1), pages 1-24, February.
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