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Towards a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism

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  • Mark M. Spiegel

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  • Mark M. Spiegel, 2002. "Towards a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism," FRBSF Economic Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue jun28.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedfel:y:2002:i:jun28:n:2002-19
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Eichengreen, Barry & Mody, Ashoka, 1999. "Would Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2343, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
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