On the Redistributive Effect of Upper Benefit Limits in Bismarckian Social Insurance
This paper examines the redistributive effect of upper benefit limits (“ceilings”) in short term Bismarckian social insurance. Using data describing the Swedish sickness benefit we show that ceilings create a small redistribution at fairly high costs in terms of total utility and political sustainability. The simulation suggests that social insurance schemes with ceilings are politically more vulnerable to competition from private insurance markets than social insurance where the same amount of redistribution is produced by progressive taxes or higher universal benefits.
Volume (Year): 17 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (Autumn)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.taloustieteellinenyhdistys.fi|
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre, 2002.
"Social Insurance Competition between Bismark and Beveridge,"
IDEI Working Papers
141, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised 2003.
- Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre, 2003. "Social insurance competition between Bismarck and Beveridge," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 181-196, July.
- Cremer, H. & Pestieau, P., 2001. "Social insurance competition between Bismarck and Beveridge," CORE Discussion Papers 2001031, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- CREMER, Helmuth & PESTIEAU, Pierre, . "Social insurance competition between Bismarck and Beveridge," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1697, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Philippe De Donder & Jean Hindriks, 1998.
"The political economy of targeting,"
Springer, vol. 95(1), pages 177-200, April.
- CASAMATTA, Georges & CREMER, Helmuth & PESTIEAU, Pierre, .
"Political sustainability and the design of social insurance,"
CORE Discussion Papers RP
1449, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Casamatta, Georges & Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre, 2000. "Political sustainability and the design of social insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 341-364, March.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fep:journl:v:17:y:2004:i:2:p:73-78. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Editorial Secretary)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.