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Strategic Manipulations and Collusions in Knaster Procedure

The Knaster’s procedure is one of the simplest and most powerful mechanisms for allocating indivisible objects among agents requiring them, but its sealed bid feature may induce some agents in altering their valuations. In this paper we study the consequences of false declarations on the agents’ payoffs. A misrepresentation of a single agent could produce a gain or a loss. So, we analyze a possible behavior of a subset of infinitely risk-averse agents and propose how to obtain a safe gain via a joint misreporting of their valuations, regardless of the declarations of the other agents.

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Article provided by Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies in its journal AUCO Czech Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 3 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (July)
Pages: 143-153

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Handle: RePEc:fau:aucocz:au2009_143
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  1. Shigehiro Serizawa, 2005. "Pairwise Strategy-Proofness and Self-Enforcing Manipulation," ISER Discussion Paper 0629, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  2. Claus-Jochen Haake & Matthias G. Raith & Francis Edward Su, 2002. "Bidding for envy-freeness: A procedural approach to n-player fair-division problems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 723-749.
  3. Herve Moulin, 2004. "Fair Division and Collective Welfare," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262633116, June.
  4. Szilvia Pápai, 2003. "Groves sealed bid auctions of heterogeneous objects with fair prices," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 371-385, 06.
  5. Szilvia Papai, 2000. "Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(6), pages 1403-1434, November.
  6. Lars-Gunnar Svensson, 2009. "Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 227-245, August.
  7. Lars-Gunnar Svensson, 1999. "Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 557-567.
  8. Holmstrom, Bengt, 1979. "Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1137-44, September.
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