The Diversification-Performance relationship in Spanish Firms: Does The CEO/S Behaviour Style matter?
The agency-stewardship theoretical framework posits that CEOs may choose to act as agents or as stewards. CEOs as agents are economically rational individuals driven by self-interest, whereas CEOs as stewards are self-actualizing individuals that behave pro-organizationally. Our study extends this framework to analyze whether the CEO/s behavior style affects the diversification-performance relationship. After applying Heckman/s method on a sample of Spanish firms, our results verify that diversification affects positively on firm performance and such effect is significantly strong when this strategy is managed and implemented by a CEO inclined to behave as steward.
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