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Tráfico de drogas, políticas de disuasión y violencia en México

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  • Lenin Arango Castillo

    (Université du Québec à Montréal)

Abstract

This paper analyzes the levels of violence generated by the implementation of policies to discourage crime in an oligopolistic market and with a closed economy. Initially we analyze a policy of tolerance, in which criminal organizations select the level of violence necessary to stay in the drug market. Subsequently, we analyze a policy of fighting against organized crime: the results show that this policy reduces the number of criminal organizations, and increases profits for those organizations that remain on the market, while increasing drug production and violence. Finally, we discuss the hypothetical case of fighting demand for drugs.

Suggested Citation

  • Lenin Arango Castillo, 2011. "Tráfico de drogas, políticas de disuasión y violencia en México," Estudios Económicos, El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos, vol. 26(2), pages 157-185.
    • Handle: RePEc:emx:esteco:v:26:y:2011:i:2:p:157-185
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    File URL: https://estudioseconomicos.colmex.mx/index.php/economicos/article/view/101/103
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    6. William P. Jennings, Jr., 1984. "A Note on the Economics of Organized Crime," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 315-321, Jul-Sep.
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    Citations

    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Análisis económico de la "Guerra" fallida contra el crimen organizado en México
      by in Tiempo Económico on 2012-04-22 13:39:46

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    deterrence policy; crime organization; violence.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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