Voluntary provision of village-level public goods: From the view of the “One Case One Meeting” system
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to analyze the formation mechanism of the “One Case One Meeting” system in rural China, which is an institutional arrangement to voluntarily provide public goods to villagers. The survey data are used to test the applicability of the “One Case One Meeting” system. Design/methodology/approach – Applying the Nash equilibrium and the nested game models, this paper analyzes the formation mechanism of the “One Case One Meeting” system. Based on the survey data, the zero-inflated Poisson regression model (ZIP) and the zero-inflated negative binomial regression model (ZINB) are applied to examine the impacts of the “One Case One Meeting” system on village-level public investment. Findings – The results suggest that the “One Case One Meeting” system can be executed more effectively, provided that the following two conditions are both satisfied: first, acquaintance community; and second, election participants have the freedom to express their real opinions. The empirical results from the ZINB model show that the system has a significant positive impact on village-level public investment in production while the results from the ZIP model show that the system does not significantly affect village-level public investment in consumption. Originality/value – Based on the findings, the paper suggests that villages adopt the “One Case One Meeting” system for issues related to public investment in production, but does not suggest this model for issues related to public investment in consumption. In addition, it is necessary to enhance democratic consciousness in farmers' education and, in order to create more channels for village public investment in production, it is necessary to regulate the election system.
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Volume (Year): 2 (2010)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
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- Groves, Theodore & Ledyard, John O, 1977.
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