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Earthquake Propensity and the Politics of Mortality Prevention

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  • Keefer, Philip
  • Neumayer, Eric
  • Plümper, Thomas

Abstract

Summary Governments can significantly reduce earthquake mortality by enforcing quake-proof construction regulation. We examine why many governments do not. First, mortality is lower in countries with higher earthquake propensity, where the payoffs to investments in mortality prevention are greater. Second, the opportunity costs of these investments are higher in poorer countries; mortality is correspondingly less responsive to propensity in poor countries. Third, mortality is higher at any level of quake propensity when governments have fewer incentives to provide public goods, such as in autocracies with less institutionalized ruling parties or in more corrupt countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Keefer, Philip & Neumayer, Eric & Plümper, Thomas, 2011. "Earthquake Propensity and the Politics of Mortality Prevention," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 39(9), pages 1530-1541, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:39:y:2011:i:9:p:1530-1541
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    1. Philip Keefer & Stuti Khemani, 2005. "Democracy, Public Expenditures, and the Poor: Understanding Political Incentives for Providing Public Services," World Bank Research Observer, World Bank Group, vol. 20(1), pages 1-27.
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    3. Eiji Yamamura, 2014. "Impact of natural disaster on public sector corruption," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 161(3), pages 385-405, December.
    4. Juncal Cunado & Susana Ferreira, 2014. "The Macroeconomic Impacts of Natural Disasters: The Case of Floods," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 90(1), pages 149-168.
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    6. Fankhauser, Samuel & McDermott, Thomas K. J., 2014. "Understanding the adaptation deficit: why are poor countries more vulnerable to climate events than rich countries?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 57620, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    7. Ferreira, Susana & Hamilton, Kirk & Vincent, Jeffrey R., 2011. "Nature, socioeconomics and adaptation to natural disasters: new evidence from floods," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5725, The World Bank.
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    9. repec:spr:nathaz:v:87:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s11069-017-2825-3 is not listed on IDEAS
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    14. Paul A. Raschky & Manijeh Schwindt, 2016. "Aid, Catastrophes and the Samaritan's Dilemma," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 83(332), pages 624-645, October.
    15. Hiroki Onuma & Kong Joo Shin & Shunsuke Managi, 2017. "Reduction of future disaster damages by learning from disaster experiences," Natural Hazards: Journal of the International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, Springer;International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, vol. 87(3), pages 1435-1452, July.
    16. Miao, Qing & Popp, David, 2014. "Necessity as the mother of invention: Innovative responses to natural disasters," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 280-295.
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    18. Hu, Shao-Long & Han, Chuan-Feng & Meng, Ling-Peng, 2016. "Stochastic optimization for investment in facilities in emergency prevention," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 14-31.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    disaster mortality political economy democracy risk public goods;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

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