Decentralization and the persistence of centralized power in Liberia

Why have decentralization reforms in Liberia, despite consistent external support, repeatedly faltered? The conventional explanation of lacking political ownership, rooted in corruption and elite self-interest, offers only a partial answer, risking circularity: reforms fail because of the very governance deficits they seek to address. Drawing on original fieldwork, this article explores how a perceived lack of political ownership is enacted in practice. It argues that Liberian political and bureaucratic elites are strategically choosing not to ‘own’ reforms to balance domestic political risks and donor expectations, producing a ‘twisted win-win’ dynamic. This concept helps unpack how a “lack of ownership” in Liberia functions in practice: state actors demonstrate limited commitment to sustain donor support while minimizing threats to entrenched power structures and privileges, and donors accept ‘good enough’ progress to satisfy institutional and reporting needs. The result is a dynamic that sustains piecemeal reform without altering the underlying neopatrimonial order. Liberia showcases how political ownership in aid-dependent contexts is relational, bounded, and co-produced rather than being merely absent.