Complementary versus semi-complementary airline partnerships
As low-cost airlines or carriers excluded from international markets by regulation may seek to expand internationally in an indirect way through code-sharing agreements, they can choose partner airlines from among domestic or international carriers. The former case results in a semi-complementary partnership, while in the latter a classic complementary alliance is formed. This paper compares welfare properties of the two types of partnerships under economies of traffic density. Semi-complementary partnerships yield higher total welfare (but not necessarily lower prices) when economies of traffic density are strong, demand is more price-sensitive, or where a carrier feeding domestic traffic to international routes is a lower cost one.
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Volume (Year): 41 (2007)
Issue (Month): 4 (May)
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References listed on IDEAS
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