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Economics students need not be greedy: Fairness and the ultimatum game

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Listed author(s):
  • Stanley, T. D.
  • Tran, Ume

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics).

Volume (Year): 27 (1998)
Issue (Month): 6 ()
Pages: 657-663

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Handle: RePEc:eee:soceco:v:27:y:1998:i:6:p:657-663
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/620175

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  1. Robert H. Frank & Thomas Gilovich & Dennis T. Regan, 1993. "Does Studying Economics Inhibit Cooperation?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(2), pages 159-171, Spring.
  2. W. Guth & R. Schmittberger & B. Schwartz, 2010. "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Levine's Working Paper Archive 291, David K. Levine.
  3. Kravitz, David A. & Gunto, Samuel, 1992. "Decisions and perceptions of recipients in ultimatum bargaining games," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 65-84.
  4. Hoffman, Elizabeth & McCabe, Kevin A & Smith, Vernon L, 1996. "On Expectations and the Monetary Stakes in Ultimatum Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 25(3), pages 289-301.
  5. Leibenstein, Harvey, 1986. "On relaxing the maximization postulate," Journal of Behavioral Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 3-13.
  6. John R. Carter & Michael D. Irons, 1991. "Are Economists Different, and If So, Why?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 171-177, Spring.
  7. Anthony M. Yezer & Robert S. Goldfarb & Paul J. Poppen, 1996. "Does Studying Economics Discourage Cooperation? Watch What We Do, Not What We Say or How We Play," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 177-186, Winter.
  8. Stanley, T. D., 1986. "Recursive economic knowledge: Hierarchy, maximization and behavioral economics," Journal of Behavioral Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 85-99.
  9. Rabin, Matthew, 1993. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1281-1302, December.
  10. Guth, Werner & Schmittberger, Rolf & Schwarze, Bernd, 1982. "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 367-388, December.
  11. Colin F. Camerer & Richard H. Thaler, 1995. "Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 209-219, Spring.
  12. Stanley, T. D., 1991. "Let's get serious about Caprice," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 37-56.
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Cited by:

  1. Bruno S. Frey & Stephan Meier, "undated". "Political Economists are Neither Selfish nor Indoctrinated," IEW - Working Papers 069, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  2. McCain, Roger A., 2008. "Cooperative games and cooperative organizations," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 37(6), pages 2155-2167, December.
  3. Evelyn Korn & Stephan Meisenzahl & Johannes Ziesecke, 2013. "How and when can economic skills enhance cooperation?," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201316, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
  4. Matteo Migheli, 2012. "Socialisation, Trust and Reciprocity among Young People," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 148(I), pages 77-95, March.
  5. McCain, Roger A., 2009. "Commitment and weakness of will in game theory and neoclassical economics," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 549-556, August.
  6. Ronald Cummings & Paul Ferraro, 2005. "Cultural diversity, discrimination and economic outcomes: An experimental analysis," Artefactual Field Experiments 00045, The Field Experiments Website.
  7. Stephen Meier & Bruno Frey, 2004. "Do Business Students Make Good Citizens?," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(2), pages 141-163.

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