IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/riibaf/v66y2023ics0275531923001526.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Do powerful CEOs affect qualitative financial disclosure? Evidence from accounting comparability

Author

Listed:
  • Majeed, Muhammad Ansar
  • Xie, Shilei
  • Ullah, Irfan
  • Fu, Jianru
  • Wang, Chunlin

Abstract

This study investigates the relationship between CEO power and financial statement comparability. Using a sample of A-listed Chinese firms for 2005–2020, we document a positive relationship between powerful CEOs and comparability. We further examined the impact of media coverage on comparability and its moderating role in the relationship between CEO power and comparability. Our results suggest that media coverage leads to higher comparability and reinforces the positive association between powerful CEO and comparability. Additionally, the positive association between CEO power and comparability is contingent on the gender of CEOs and is reversed under higher economic policy uncertainty. Our findings support the transparency argument, the quiet life hypothesis, and the media’s governance role. These results are robust to alternative measures of CEO power, comparability, econometric methods, and endogeneity.

Suggested Citation

  • Majeed, Muhammad Ansar & Xie, Shilei & Ullah, Irfan & Fu, Jianru & Wang, Chunlin, 2023. "Do powerful CEOs affect qualitative financial disclosure? Evidence from accounting comparability," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:riibaf:v:66:y:2023:i:c:s0275531923001526
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ribaf.2023.102026
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0275531923001526
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.ribaf.2023.102026?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Comparability; CEO power; Media coverage; China;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • M40 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:riibaf:v:66:y:2023:i:c:s0275531923001526. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ribaf .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.