Rent control with reputation: theory and evidence
No abstract is available for this item.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Olsen, Edgar O, 1972. "An Econometric Analysis of Rent Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 80(6), pages 1081-1100, Nov.-Dec..
- Porter, Robert H., 1983. "Optimal cartel trigger price strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 313-338, April.
- Rotemberg, Julio J & Saloner, Garth, 1986. "A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars during Booms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 390-407, June.
- Buchanan, James M & Bush, Winston C, 1974. "Political Constraints on Contractual Redistribution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(2), pages 153-57, May.
- Marks, Denton, 1984. "The effects of partial-coverage rent control on the price and quantity of rental housing," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 360-369, November.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:regeco:v:28:y:1998:i:6:p:679-710. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.