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Debtholder responses to controlling shareholders’ share pledging

Author

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  • Hou, Xiaohui
  • Lu, Xiaonan

Abstract

This study investigates debtholders’ responses to controlling shareholders’ share pledging. We found that share pledging by controlling shareholders is crucial for reducing agency costs. This lessens the information asymmetry of outsiders by strengthening pledgee supervision, and decreases companies’ risk-taking by adopting a relatively conservative investment strategy that hedges excessive risks. This also reduces the impact of insider control, decreases the interest spread, and increases the length of loan maturity. Further analyses show that the favorable effect of share pledging on bank loan covenants weakens for companies with a higher degree of financing deficit. Additionally, the role of share pledging varies with the agency costs of companies’ insider controls. The effects of share pledging on bank loan terms are more profound for companies with a higher degree of corporate governance performance. Robustness analyses addressing potential endogeneity further confirm our primary conclusions.

Suggested Citation

  • Hou, Xiaohui & Lu, Xiaonan, 2024. "Debtholder responses to controlling shareholders’ share pledging," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 98(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:quaeco:v:98:y:2024:i:c:s1062976924001340
    DOI: 10.1016/j.qref.2024.101928
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Share pledging; Controlling shareholder; Bank loan; Agency problem; China;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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