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Double inefficiency in optimally organized firms

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  • Bos, Dieter
  • Peters, Wolfgang

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  • Bos, Dieter & Peters, Wolfgang, 1995. "Double inefficiency in optimally organized firms," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 355-375, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:56:y:1995:i:3:p:355-375
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hammond, Thomas H & Miller, Gary J, 1992. "Moral Hazard in Work Organizations: A Comment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 74(2), pages 245-256, September.
    2. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-795, December.
    3. Gaynor, Martin, 1992. "More on Moral Hazard in Organizations: Reply," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 74(2), pages 257-262, September.
    4. Boardman, Anthony E & Vining, Aidan R, 1989. "Ownership and Performance in Competitive Environments: A Comparison of the Performance of Private, Mixed, and State-Owned Enterprises," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 32(1), pages 1-33, April.
    5. Fershtman, Chaim, 1990. "The Interdependence between Ownership Status and Market Structure: The Case of Privatization," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 57(227), pages 319-328, August.
    6. Nett, Lorenz & Peters, Wolfgang, 1993. "The uniqueness of the subscription equilibrium with endogenous labor supply," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 42(2-3), pages 139-142.
    7. Mukesh Eswaran & Ashok Kotwal, 1984. "The Moral Hazard of Budget-Breaking," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(4), pages 578-581, Winter.
    8. James A. Mirrlees, 1976. "The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority Within an Organization," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(1), pages 105-131, Spring.
    9. Beckmann, Martin J., 1977. "Management production functions and the theory of the firm," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 1-18, February.
    10. Hausman, Jerry A & Poterba, James M, 1987. "Household Behavior and the Tax Reform Act of 1986," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 101-119, Summer.
    11. Martin J. Beckmann, 1960. "Some Aspects of Returns to Scale in Business Administration," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 74(3), pages 464-471.
    12. Martin Gaynor, 1989. "The presence of moral hazard in budget breaking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 61(3), pages 261-267, June.
    13. Ballard, Charles L & Shoven, John B & Whalley, John, 1985. "General Equilibrium Computations of the Marginal Welfare Costs of Taxes in the United States," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(1), pages 128-138, March.
    14. Eric Rasmusen, 1987. "Moral Hazard in Risk-Averse Teams," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(3), pages 428-435, Autumn.
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    Cited by:

    1. Fumitoshi Mizutani & Eri Nakamura, 2017. "How do governance factors affect inefficiency? Stochastic frontier analysis of public utility firms in Japan," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, vol. 44(3), pages 267-289, September.
    2. Toshihiro Matsumura & Noriaki Matsushima & Ikuo Ishibashi, 2009. "Privatization and entries of foreign enterprises in a differentiated industry," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 98(3), pages 203-219, December.
    3. Fumitoshi Mizutani & Eri Nakamura, 2016. "Factors Affecting Inefficiency Level: Stochastic Frontier Analysis of Public Utility Firms in Japan," Discussion Papers 2016-02, Kobe University, Graduate School of Business Administration.
    4. Fumitoshi Mizutani & Eri Nakamura, 2013. "Regulation, Competition, Diversification, Governance and Costs: An Empirical Analysis of Public Utility and Manufacturing Firms in Japan," Discussion Papers 2013-25, Kobe University, Graduate School of Business Administration.
    5. Fumitoshi Mizutani & Eri Nakamura, 2014. "What Most Affects A Firm' s Costs: Internal or External Factors, or Both?," Discussion Papers 2014-22, Kobe University, Graduate School of Business Administration.
    6. Juan Carlos Bárcena-Ruiz, 2008. "Are the public firms more innovative than the private ones?," Prague Economic Papers, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2008(2), pages 157-167.

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