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Tax evasion by tax deferment: Sham litigation with an informal credit market

Author

Listed:
  • Marjit, Sugata
  • Mishra, Suryaprakash
  • Mitra, Sandip

Abstract

We show theoretically how tax evasion is facilitated by informal credit market through tax deferment. Our model is empirically based. Using sham litigation, tax evaders earn a higher rate of return than the stipulated penalty rate for tax evasion while the government loses tax revenue. We propose an upfront part–payment of the disputed amount of tax as a solution to the form of tax evasion we describe.

Suggested Citation

  • Marjit, Sugata & Mishra, Suryaprakash & Mitra, Sandip, 2021. "Tax evasion by tax deferment: Sham litigation with an informal credit market," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:69:y:2021:i:c:s0176268021000094
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2021.102008
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Frank A. Cowell, 1990. "Cheating the Government: The Economics of Evasion," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262532484, December.
    2. Marjit, Sugata & Ghosh, Sudeep & Biswas, Amit, 2007. "Informality, corruption and trade reform," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 777-789, September.
    3. Hillman,Arye L., 2019. "Public Finance and Public Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107136311, August.
    4. Joel Slemrod, 2007. "Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 21(1), pages 25-48, Winter.
    5. Sugata Marjit & Vivekananda Mukherjee & Martin Kolmar, 2006. "Poverty, taxation and governance," The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(3), pages 325-333.
    6. Sugata Marjit & Saibal Kar, 2012. "Firm Heterogeneity, Informal Wage and Good Governance," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(4), pages 527-539, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Sugata Marjit & Suryaprakash Mishra, 2021. "Optimum Size of the Informal Credit Market - A Political Economy Perspective," CESifo Working Paper Series 9252, CESifo.
    2. Rashmi Ahuja & Sugata Marjit, 2026. "Financial Development, Credit Rationing and Informal Credit Markets: Implications for Pattern of Trade," CESifo Working Paper Series 12516, CESifo.
    3. Subhayu Bandyopadhyay & Sugata Marjit & Santiago Pinto & Marcel Thum, 2025. "Public Good Provision, Tax Evasion, and Illicit Production," Working Papers 2025-005, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, revised 14 Jun 2026.
    4. Sugata Marjit & Koushik Hati & Lei Yang, 2025. "Status Seeking Taxpayer and Tax Evasion," CESifo Working Paper Series 12193, CESifo.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • H32 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Firm
    • K34 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Tax Law
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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