IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/pacfin/v56y2019icp71-92.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Loan financing and investment in princeling-backed firms

Author

Listed:
  • Li, Qing
  • Liu, Qigui
  • Ma, Shiguang
  • Tian, Gary Gang

Abstract

This study investigates the role of princelings in Chinese listed firms. Our findings suggest that princelings ensure better access to bank loans for non-SOEs but bring no significant benefits to SOEs. Our empirical results further indicate that bank lending decisions are distorted for princeling-backed firms due to the privileges and protections they can obtain from the higher levels of the government through princelings' family ties. Moreover, we find that, due to excess long-term bank loans, princeling-backed non-SOEs tend to overinvest, which ultimately results in lower investment efficiency. Furthermore, we use the difference-in-difference method to capture the effect of the exogenous shock of the recent anti-corruption campaign in China on princelings and corporate finance and investment. We demonstrate that the anti-corruption campaign launched by the Chinese government in 2012 effectively weakened the power of princeling connections. Overall, our study suggests that by distorting bank lending decisions and encouraging overinvestment, the involvement of princelings in firms causes resource misallocation which favours princeling-backed firms and discourages investment in non-princeling-backed firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Li, Qing & Liu, Qigui & Ma, Shiguang & Tian, Gary Gang, 2019. "Loan financing and investment in princeling-backed firms," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 71-92.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pacfin:v:56:y:2019:i:c:p:71-92
    DOI: 10.1016/j.pacfin.2019.05.009
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0927538X18304384
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.pacfin.2019.05.009?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Blau, Benjamin M. & Brough, Tyler J. & Thomas, Diana W., 2013. "Corporate lobbying, political connections, and the bailout of banks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(8), pages 3007-3017.
    2. Claessens, Stijn & Feijen, Erik & Laeven, Luc, 2008. "Political connections and preferential access to finance: The role of campaign contributions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3), pages 554-580, June.
    3. Mara Faccio, 2010. "Differences between Politically Connected and Nonconnected Firms: A Cross‐Country Analysis," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 39(3), pages 905-928, September.
    4. Fan, Joseph P.H. & Wong, T.J. & Zhang, Tianyu, 2007. "Politically connected CEOs, corporate governance, and Post-IPO performance of China's newly partially privatized firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 330-357, May.
    5. Liu, Qigui & Luo, Jinbo & Tian, Gary Gang, 2016. "Managerial professional connections versus political connections: Evidence from firms' access to informal financing resources," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 179-200.
    6. Cull, Robert & Xu, Lixin Colin, 2005. "Institutions, ownership, and finance: the determinants of profit reinvestment among Chinese firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 117-146, July.
    7. Drazen, Allan & Limao, Nuno & Stratmann, Thomas, 2007. "Political contribution caps and lobby formation: Theory and evidence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(3-4), pages 723-754, April.
    8. Boubakri, Narjess & Cosset, Jean-Claude & Guedhami, Omrane & Saffar, Walid, 2011. "The political economy of residual state ownership in privatized firms: Evidence from emerging markets," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 244-258, April.
    9. Chen, Charles J.P. & Li, Zengquan & Su, Xijia & Sun, Zheng, 2011. "Rent-seeking incentives, corporate political connections, and the control structure of private firms: Chinese evidence," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 229-243, April.
    10. Liu, Jianlei & Uchida, Konari & Gao, Ruidong, 2012. "Political connections and the long-term stock performance of Chinese IPOs," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 814-833.
    11. Berkman, Henk & Cole, Rebel A. & Fu, Lawrence J., 2010. "Political Connections and Minority-Shareholder Protection: Evidence from Securities-Market Regulation in China," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 45(6), pages 1391-1417, December.
    12. Bennedsen, Morten & Feldmann, Sven E., 2006. "Informational lobbying and political contributions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(4-5), pages 631-656, May.
    13. Johnson, Simon & Mitton, Todd, 2003. "Cronyism and capital controls: evidence from Malaysia," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 351-382, February.
    14. Yan-Leung Cheung & P. Raghavendra Rau & Aris Stouraitis, 2010. "Helping Hand or Grabbing Hand? Central vs. Local Government Shareholders in Chinese Listed Firms," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 14(4), pages 669-694.
    15. Liu, Qigui & Tang, Jinghua & Tian, Gary Gang, 2013. "Does political capital create value in the IPO market? Evidence from China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 395-413.
    16. Eitan Goldman & Jörg Rocholl & Jongil So, 2013. "Politically Connected Boards of Directors and The Allocation of Procurement Contracts," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 17(5), pages 1617-1648.
    17. Mingyi Hung & T. J. Wong & Fang Zhang, 2015. "The Value of Political Ties Versus Market Credibility: Evidence from Corporate Scandals in China," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 32(4), pages 1641-1675, December.
    18. T.J. Wong & Mingyi Hung & Fang Zhang, 2015. "The Value of Political Ties versus Market Credibility: Evidence from Corporate Scandals in China," HKUST IEMS Working Paper Series 2015-18, HKUST Institute for Emerging Market Studies, revised Mar 2015.
    19. Zhifeng Yang, 2013. "Do Political Connections Add Value to Audit Firms? Evidence from IPO Audits in China," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 30(3), pages 891-921, September.
    20. Charles JP Chen & Yuan Ding & Chansog (Francis) Kim, 2010. "High-level politically connected firms, corruption, and analyst forecast accuracy around the world," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 41(9), pages 1505-1524, December.
    21. Yeh, Yin-Hua & Shu, Pei-Gi & Chiu, Shean-Bii, 2013. "Political connections, corporate governance and preferential bank loans," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 1079-1101.
    22. Fan, Joseph P.H. & Rui, Oliver Meng & Zhao, Mengxin, 2008. "Public governance and corporate finance: Evidence from corruption cases," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 343-364, September.
    23. Boubakri, Narjess & Guedhami, Omrane & Mishra, Dev & Saffar, Walid, 2012. "Political connections and the cost of equity capital," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 541-559.
    24. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1994. "Politicians and Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(4), pages 995-1025.
    25. Liu, Qigui & Luo, Tianpei & Tian, Gary, 2016. "Political connections with corrupt government bureaucrats and corporate M&A decisions: A natural experiment from the anti-corruption cases in China," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 52-80.
    26. Li, Kai & Yue, Heng & Zhao, Longkai, 2009. "Ownership, institutions, and capital structure: Evidence from China," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 471-490, September.
    27. Chen, Donghua & Guan, Yuyan & Zhang, Tianyu & Zhao, Gang, 2017. "Political connection of financial intermediaries: Evidence from China's IPO market," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 15-31.
    28. MARA FACCIO & RONALD W. MASULIS & JOHN J. McCONNELL, 2006. "Political Connections and Corporate Bailouts," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(6), pages 2597-2635, December.
    29. Chen, Shimin & Sun, Zheng & Tang, Song & Wu, Donghui, 2011. "Government intervention and investment efficiency: Evidence from China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 259-271, April.
    30. Raymond Fisman, 2001. "Estimating the Value of Political Connections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 1095-1102, September.
    31. Stephen P. Ferris & Reza Houston & David Javakhadze, 2019. "It is a Sweetheart of a Deal: Political Connections and Corporate‐Federal Contracting," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 54(1), pages 57-84, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Khaw, Karren Lee-Hwei & Zainudin, Rozaimah & Rashid, Rasidah Mohd, 2019. "Cost of debt financing: Does political connection matter?," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(C).
    2. Xiaoxu Ling & Siyuan Yan & Louis T. W. Cheng, 2022. "Investor relations under short‐selling pressure: Evidence from strategic signaling by company site visits," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(7-8), pages 1145-1174, July.
    3. Ding, Haoyuan & Hu, Yichuan & Kim, Kenneth A. & Xie, Mi, 2023. "Relationship-based debt financing of Chinese private sector firms: The role of social connections to banks versus political connections," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    4. Yuanyue Wang & Zhaohui Yu & Xiaojing Yi, 2022. "Financing liabilities and inefficient investment of listed companies: Based on the adjustment effect of different financial structures," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(4), pages 848-875, December.
    5. Wu, Kai & Liu, Jiming, 2022. "Purifying political ecology: How anti-corruption campaign affects capital structure decisions?," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
    6. Ting Liu & Shaoqing Kang & Lihong Wang, 2024. "The externality of politically connected directors’ resignations on peers’ cost of debt," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 62(3), pages 1191-1221, April.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Wei, Chunyan & Hu, Shiyang & Chen, Feng, 2020. "Do political connection disruptions increase labor costs in a government-dominated market? Evidence from publicly listed companies in China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    2. Stephen Gray & Iman Harymawan & John Nowland, 2016. "Political and government connections on corporate boards in Australia: Good for business?," Australian Journal of Management, Australian School of Business, vol. 41(1), pages 3-26, February.
    3. Cull, Robert & Li, Wei & Sun, Bo & Xu, Lixin Colin, 2015. "Government connections and financial constraints: Evidence from a large representative sample of Chinese firms," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 271-294.
    4. Jackowicz, Krzysztof & Kozłowski, Łukasz & Podgórski, Błażej & Winkler-Drews, Tadeusz, 2020. "Do political connections shield from negative shocks? Evidence from rating changes in advanced emerging economies," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 51(C).
    5. Yu, Xin & Zheng, Ying, 2019. "The value of political ties for firms experiencing enforcement actions: Evidence from China," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 24-45.
    6. Jia, Ning & Mao, Xinshu & Yuan, Rongli, 2019. "Political connections and directors' and officers' liability insurance – Evidence from China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 353-372.
    7. Xiao, Gang & Shen, Sichen, 2022. "To pollute or not to pollute: Political connections and corporate environmental performance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    8. Thanh Ngo & Jurica Susnjara, 2020. "Government contracts and US bond yield spreads: A study on costs and benefits of materialized political connections," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(7-8), pages 1059-1085, July.
    9. Liu, Qigui & Tang, Jinghua & Tian, Gary Gang, 2013. "Does political capital create value in the IPO market? Evidence from China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 395-413.
    10. Park, SeHyun, 2023. "Profitability of politically corrupt firms: Evidence from Romania," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    11. Brahma, Sanjukta & Zhang, Jing & Boateng, Agyenim & Nwafor, Chioma, 2023. "Political connection and M&A performance: Evidence from China," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 372-389.
    12. Jackowicz, Krzysztof & Kozłowski, Łukasz & Mielcarz, Paweł, 2014. "Political connections and operational performance of non-financial firms: New evidence from Poland," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 20(C), pages 109-135.
    13. Liu, Li & Liu, Qigui & Tian, Gary & Wang, Peipei, 2018. "Government connections and the persistence of profitability: Evidence from Chinese listed firms," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 110-129.
    14. He, Lerong & Wan, Hong & Zhou, Xin, 2014. "How are political connections valued in China? Evidence from market reaction to CEO succession," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 141-152.
    15. Liu, Qigui & Luo, Tianpei & Tian, Gary, 2016. "Political connections with corrupt government bureaucrats and corporate M&A decisions: A natural experiment from the anti-corruption cases in China," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 52-80.
    16. Shi, Haina & Xu, Haoping & Zhang, Xin, 2018. "Do politically connected independent directors create or destroy value?," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 82-96.
    17. Nnadi, Modestus I. & Sorwar, Ghulam & Eskandari, Rasol & Chizema, Amon, 2021. "Political connections and seasoned equity offerings," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 133(C).
    18. Jia, Yuecheng & Simkins, Betty & Feng, Hongrui, 2023. "Political connections and short sellers," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 146(C).
    19. Barraza, Santiago & Rossi, Martín A & Ruzzier, Christian A, 2022. "Sleeping with the enemy: The perils of having the government on(the)board," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 641-651.
    20. Wong, Wai-Yan & Hooy, Chee-Wooi, 2018. "Do types of political connection affect firm performance differently?," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 297-317.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Princelings; Princeling-backed firms; Political connections; Bank loans; Investment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:pacfin:v:56:y:2019:i:c:p:71-92. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/pacfin .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.