Gradient dynamics in population games: Some basic results
When each player in a population game continuously adjusts her action to move up the payoff gradient, then the state variable (the action distribution) obeys a nonlinear partial differential equation. We find conditions that render gradient adjustment myopically optimal and analyze two broad classes of population games. For one class, we use known results to establish the existence and uniqueness of solutions to the PDE. In some cases, these solutions exhibit shock waves or rarefaction waves. For a second class, we use a local form of Nash equilibrium to characterize the steady state solutions of the PDE and find sufficient conditions for asymptotic convergence.
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