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Modeling the act of measurement in the social sciences

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  • Temzelides, Ted

Abstract

Motivated by time-series experimental designs, we develop a model of the act of measurement in the social sciences. Meaningful measurements are represented by operators that obey a non-commutative algebra. Thus, the order in which information is extracted matters. In addition, responses to questions about an attribute depend on whether information about another attribute has previously been extracted. Measurement "forces" the subject to obtain one value of the attribute, the one measured by the observer. An uncertainty principle imposes a fundamental limit on the ability to extract detailed information about two distinct attributes within a short period of time.

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  • Temzelides, Ted, 2010. "Modeling the act of measurement in the social sciences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(4), pages 607-615, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:46:y:2010:i:4:p:607-615
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Pierfrancesco La Mura, 2003. "Correlated Equilibria of Classical Strategic Games with Quantum Signals," Papers quant-ph/0309033, arXiv.org.
    2. Jörgen W. Weibull, 2004. "Testing Game Theory," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Steffen Huck (ed.), Advances in Understanding Strategic Behaviour, chapter 6, pages 85-104, Palgrave Macmillan.
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