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Correlated Equilibria of Classical Strategic Games with Quantum Signals

Author

Listed:
  • Pierfrancesco La Mura

    (Leipzig Graduate School of Management)

Abstract

Correlated equilibria are sometimes more efficient than the Nash equilibria of a game without signals. We investigate whether the availability of quantum signals in the context of a classical strategic game may allow the players to achieve even better efficiency than in any correlated equilibrium with classical signals, and find the answer to be positive.

Suggested Citation

  • Pierfrancesco La Mura, 2003. "Correlated Equilibria of Classical Strategic Games with Quantum Signals," Game Theory and Information 0309001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0309001
    Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 8
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    File URL: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/game/papers/0309/0309001.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Aumann, Robert J, 1987. "Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(1), pages 1-18, January.
    2. Aumann, Robert J., 1974. "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 67-96, March.
    3. Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983. "Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April.
    4. Bernardo A. Huberman & Tad Hogg HP Laboratories, 2003. "Quantum Solution of Coordination Problems," Game Theory and Information 0306005, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Danilov, V.I. & Lambert-Mogiliansky, A., 2008. "Measurable systems and behavioral sciences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 315-340, May.
    2. Adam Brandenburger, 2007. "A Connection Between Correlation in Game Theory and Quantum Mechanics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001725, David K. Levine.
    3. Temzelides, Ted, 2010. "Modeling the act of measurement in the social sciences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(4), pages 607-615, July.
    4. Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky, 2010. "Endogenous preferences in games with type indeterminate players," PSE Working Papers halshs-00564895, HAL.
    5. Emmanuel Haven, 2008. "Private Information and the ‘Information Function’: A Survey of Possible Uses," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 64(2), pages 193-228, March.
    6. Brandenburger, Adam, 2010. "The relationship between quantum and classical correlation in games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 175-183, May.
    7. Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Jerome Busemeyer, 2012. "Quantum Type Indeterminacy in Dynamic Decision-Making: Self-Control through Identity Management," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 3(2), pages 1-22, May.
    8. Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Ismael Martinez-Martinez, 2014. "Basic Framework for Games with Quantum-like Players," PSE Working Papers hal-01095472, HAL.
    9. Vladimir Ivanovitch Danilov & Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky, 2005. "Non-classical measurement theory: a framework forbehavioral sciences," Working Papers halshs-00590714, HAL.
    10. Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Ismael Martinez-Martinez, 2014. "Basic Framework for Games with Quantum-like Players," Working Papers hal-01095472, HAL.
    11. David K Levine, 2005. "Quantum Games Have No News For Economics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000001000, David K. Levine.
    12. Adam Brandenburger, 2008. "The Relationship Between Classical and Quantum Correlation in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002312, David K. Levine.
    13. Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky, 2010. "Endogenous preferences in games with type indeterminate players," Working Papers halshs-00564895, HAL.
    14. V. I. Danilov & A. Lambert-Mogiliansky, 2005. "Non-classical Measurement Theory: a Framework for Behavioral Sciences," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000000899, David K. Levine.
    15. Jerry Busemeyer & Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky, 2009. "TI-games I: An exploration of Type Indeterminacy in strategic decision-making," PSE Working Papers halshs-00566780, HAL.
    16. Jerry Busemeyer & Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky, 2009. "TI-games I: An exploration of Type Indeterminacy in strategic decision-making," Working Papers halshs-00566780, HAL.
    17. Jérôme Busemeyer & Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky, 2012. "Quantum Type Indeterminacy in Dynamic Decision-Making: Self-control Through Identity Management," Working Papers halshs-00692024, HAL.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    strategic games; quantum mechanics; correlated equilibrium; coordination; entanglement; efficiency;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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