IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/marpol/v62y2015icp178-185.html

ITQ markets with administrative costs: An application to the industrial common sardine and anchovy fishery in Chile

Author

Listed:
  • Salgado, Hugo
  • Chávez, Carlos A.
  • Miller, Montserrat
  • Stranlund, John K.

Abstract

Using numerical simulations of the mixed common sardine and anchovy fishery of central-southern Chile, this article studies the effects of the distribution of administrative costs between the government and the fishing industry in an individual transferable quota system. Consistent with recent theoretical results, the analysis indicates that the presence and distribution of the administrative costs can have important impacts on the performance of an individual transferable quota system. The numerical simulations reveal significant and non-monotonic effects on the optimal paths of transferable quotas, biomass, quota price, size of the active fishing fleet, and the value of the fishery. While the effects of the distribution of administrative costs are complicated in the case study under analysis, the results suggest that it is likely optimal for the industry and government to share the administrative costs in this fishery.

Suggested Citation

  • Salgado, Hugo & Chávez, Carlos A. & Miller, Montserrat & Stranlund, John K., 2015. "ITQ markets with administrative costs: An application to the industrial common sardine and anchovy fishery in Chile," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 178-185.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:marpol:v:62:y:2015:i:c:p:178-185
    DOI: 10.1016/j.marpol.2015.09.010
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308597X15002614
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.marpol.2015.09.010?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sigbjorn Tveteras & Carlos Paredes & Julio Peña, 2011. "Individual Fishing Quotas in Peru: Stopping the Race for Anchovies," ILADES-UAH Working Papers inv263, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Business.
    2. Tom Tietenberg, 2003. "The Tradable-Permits Approach to Protecting the Commons: Lessons for Climate Change," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 19(3), pages 400-419.
    3. Chávez, Carlos & González, Nuria & Salgado, Hugo, 2008. "ITQs under illegal fishing: An application to the red shrimp fishery in Chile," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 570-579, July.
    4. Arnason, Ragnar & Hannesson, Rögnvaldur & Schrank, William E., 2000. "Costs of fisheries management: the cases of Iceland, Norway and Newfoundland," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 233-243, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Hugo Salgado & Carlos Chávez, 2016. "Using Taxes to Deter Illegal Fishing in ITQ Systems," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 64(4), pages 709-724, August.
    2. Parés, Claudio & Dresdner, Jorge & Salgado, Hugo, 2015. "Who should set the total allowable catch? Social preferences and legitimacy in fisheries management institutions," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 36-43.
    3. Itziar Lazkano & Linda Nøstbakken, 2016. "Quota Enforcement and Capital Investment in Natural Resource Industries," Marine Resource Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(3), pages 339-354.
    4. Dr Barry Naughten, 2013. "Emissions Pricing, 'Complementary Policies' and 'Direct Action' in the Australian Electricity Supply Sector: 'Lock-in' and Investment," CCEP Working Papers 1304, Centre for Climate & Energy Policy, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
    5. Yu Nie, 2015. "A New Tradable Credit Scheme for the Morning Commute Problem," Networks and Spatial Economics, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 719-741, September.
    6. John Stranlund & Carlos Chávez, 2013. "Who should bear the administrative costs of an emissions tax?," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 44(1), pages 53-79, August.
    7. Yuanqiao Chen & Zhisong Chen & Jianhui Peng, 2021. "How does emission right-based lending contribute to sustainable production and green financing? A modelling study," Environment, Development and Sustainability: A Multidisciplinary Approach to the Theory and Practice of Sustainable Development, Springer, vol. 23(9), pages 13945-13972, September.
    8. Miola, A. & Marra, M. & Ciuffo, B., 2011. "Designing a climate change policy for the international maritime transport sector: Market-based measures and technological options for global and regional policy actions," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(9), pages 5490-5498, September.
    9. Christopher Hansman & Jonas Hjort & Gianmarco León, 2015. "Firm's response and unintended health consequences of industrial regulations," Economics Working Papers 1469, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    10. Kruger, Joseph & Pizer, William A., 2004. "The EU Emissions Trading Directive: Opportunities and Potential Pitfalls," Discussion Papers 10679, Resources for the Future.
    11. Laurent-Lucchetti, Jérémy, 2009. "Rights on what is left," MPRA Paper 27285, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Michael G. Pollitt & Irina Shaorshadze, 2013. "The role of behavioural economics in energy and climate policy," Chapters, in: Roger Fouquet (ed.), Handbook on Energy and Climate Change, chapter 24, pages 523-546, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    13. Jo-Ann Pattinson & Gillian Harrison & Caroline Mullen & Simon Shepherd, 2022. "Combining Tradable Credit Schemes with a New Form of Road Pricing: Producing Liveable Cities and Meeting Decarbonisation Goals," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(14), pages 1-22, July.
    14. Liao, Haolan & Wu, Di & Wang, Yuhan & Lyu, Zeyu & Sun, Hongmei & Nie, Yongyou & He, He, 2022. "Impacts of carbon trading mechanism on closed-loop supply chain: A case study of stringer pallet remanufacturing," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    15. Stahn, Hubert, 2026. "Voluntary management of fisheries under the threat of uncertain legislation," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 239(C).
    16. Tracey Mangin & Christopher Costello & James Anderson & Ragnar Arnason & Matthew Elliott & Steve D Gaines & Ray Hilborn & Emily Peterson & Rashid Sumaila, 2018. "Are fishery management upgrades worth the cost?," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 13(9), pages 1-24, September.
    17. Juan Pablo Montero, 2007. "An Auction Mechanism for the Commons: Some Extensions," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 44(130), pages 141-150.
    18. John Stranlund & Wei Zhang, 2008. "Bankruptcy risk and the performance of tradable permit markets," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 17(9), pages 1-9.
    19. Mehdi Fadaee & Luca Lambertini, 2015. "Non-tradeable pollution permits as green R&D incentives," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 17(1), pages 27-42, January.
    20. Kampas, Athanasios & Mamalis, Spyridon, 2006. "Assessing the Distributional Impacts of Transferable Pollution Permits: The Case of Phosphorus Pollution Management at a River Basin Scale," Agricultural Economics Review, Greek Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 7(2), pages 1-12, July.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:marpol:v:62:y:2015:i:c:p:178-185. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/marpol .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.