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Costs of fisheries management: the cases of Iceland, Norway and Newfoundland

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  • Arnason, Ragnar
  • Hannesson, Rögnvaldur
  • Schrank, William E.

Abstract

This paper reports on the results of an investigation of management costs in the fisheries of Iceland, Newfoundland and Norway and discusses them in a more general framework. Management costs are defined as costs necessary to overcome the problems associated with common property. The question of whether management costs should be paid by industry is discussed, as is the likely effect of user pay on the efficiency with which management is provided. Since management has public goods characteristics, it is likely that there is an unavoidable role for government in providing these services. The question of who pays for it is separate, and recovering costs from industry has both efficiency and optimal taxation aspects. A greater involvement in management by industry further raises the question of compatibility between the industry's interests and the public interest. Measured as percent of gross value of fish landings the management costs are by far highest in Newfoundland (15-25%), lowest in Iceland (about 3%), with Norway in the middle (about 10%). Management costs thus appear to be substantial and quite variable. This gives rise to three conclusions. First, when calculating optimal harvesting and investment paths one must take the management costs of implementing these paths explicitly into account. Second, what is the economic efficiency of management? Could the same level of benefits be produced at lower costs? Third, can fisheries management expenditures of the magnitude discussed be justified in the sense that the benefits exceed the costs?

Suggested Citation

  • Arnason, Ragnar & Hannesson, Rögnvaldur & Schrank, William E., 2000. "Costs of fisheries management: the cases of Iceland, Norway and Newfoundland," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 233-243, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:marpol:v:24:y:2000:i:3:p:233-243
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Coglan, Louisa & Pascoe, Sean, 2015. "Corporate-cooperative management of fisheries: A potential alternative governance structure for low value small fisheries?," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 27-35.
    2. Salgado, Hugo & Chávez, Carlos A. & Miller, Montserrat & Stranlund, John K., 2015. "ITQ markets with administrative costs: An application to the industrial common sardine and anchovy fishery in Chile," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 178-185.
    3. Salamanca, A.M., 2003. "The cost of action: CRM investment in the Philippines," Naga, The WorldFish Center, vol. 26(2), pages 25-29.
    4. Bose, Shekar & Galvan, Arna, 2005. "Export supply of New Zealand's live rock lobster to Japan: an empirical analysis," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 111-123, January.
    5. van Dijk, Diana & Haijema, Rene & Hendrix, Eligius M.T. & Groeneveld, Rolf A. & van Ierland, Ekko C., 2013. "Fluctuating quota and management costs under multiannual adjustment of fish quota," Ecological Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 265(C), pages 230-238.
    6. Funk, Matt, 2007. "On the Problem of Dependent People: hyperbolic discounting in Atlantic Canadian island jurisdictions," MPRA Paper 14522, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Burgess, Matthew G. & Carrella, Ernesto & Drexler, Michael & Axtell, Robert L. & Bailey, Richard M. & Watson, James R. & Cabral, Reniel B. & Clemence, Michaela & Costello, Christopher & Dorsett, Chris, 2018. "Opportunities for agent-based modeling in human dimensions of fisheries," SocArXiv gzhm5, Center for Open Science.
    8. Itziar Lazkano & Linda Nøstbakken, 2016. "Quota Enforcement and Capital Investment in Natural Resource Industries," Marine Resource Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(3), pages 339-354.
    9. Hugo Salgado & Carlos Chávez, 2016. "Using Taxes to Deter Illegal Fishing in ITQ Systems," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 64(4), pages 709-724, August.
    10. Jensen, Frank & Nøstbakken, Linda, 2016. "A corporate-crime perspective on fisheries: liability rules and non-compliance," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 21(3), pages 371-392, June.
    11. Parés, Claudio & Dresdner, Jorge & Salgado, Hugo, 2015. "Who should set the total allowable catch? Social preferences and legitimacy in fisheries management institutions," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 36-43.
    12. Tracey Mangin & Christopher Costello & James Anderson & Ragnar Arnason & Matthew Elliott & Steve D Gaines & Ray Hilborn & Emily Peterson & Rashid Sumaila, 2018. "Are fishery management upgrades worth the cost?," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 13(9), pages 1-24, September.
    13. Kling, David M. & Sanchirico, James N. & Fackler, Paul L., 2017. "Optimal monitoring and control under state uncertainty: Application to lionfish management," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 223-245.
    14. Kanjilal, Kiriti & Munoz-Garcia, Felix, 2018. "Common Pool Resources with Endogenous Equity Shares," Working Papers 2018-4, School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University.
    15. Sabau, Gabriela & van Zyll de Jong, Michael, 2015. "From unjust uneconomic growth to sustainable fisheries in Newfoundland: The true costs of closing the inshore fishery for groundfish," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 376-389.
    16. Arnason, Ragnar, 2009. "Fisheries management and operations research," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 193(3), pages 741-751, March.
    17. U. Srinivasan & William Cheung & Reg Watson & U. Sumaila, 2010. "Food security implications of global marine catch losses due to overfishing," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 183-200, October.

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