Impacts of demand uncertainty on retailer's dominance and manufacturer-retailer supply chain cooperation
Recent studies in marketing and distribution channels have shown that the balance of power between manufacturers and retailers is shifting. Based on this observation, we investigate a two-echelon supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer in this paper. We first develop retailer-dominant non-cooperative game models by introducing a sensitivity of retailer's order quantity to manufacturer's wholesale price; then we analyze two cooperative scenarios, in which the Nash bargaining model is utilized to implement profit sharing between the manufacturer and the retailer. Under the assumption that the manufacturer and the retailer are risk-neutral, we find that the manufacturer and the retailer can bargain to cooperate at any level of retail-market demand uncertainty with exogenous retail price. However, the cooperation is conditional on retail-market demand uncertainty with endogenous retail price: it can be implemented if the fluctuation of retail-market demand is relatively small, and the measure of retail-market demand uncertainty does not exceed an upper bound. Theoretical and numerical analyses show that the retailer's dominance over the manufacturer increases with the increase in the sensitivity of retailer's order quantity to manufacturer's wholesale price under a limitation of retail-market demand uncertainty. Numerical analyses also show that the retailer's dominance decreases with the increase in retail-market demand uncertainty.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 36 (2008)
Issue (Month): 5 (October)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/375/description#description|
|Order Information:|| Postal: http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/supportfaq.cws_home/regional|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Barry Alan Pasternack, 1985. "Optimal Pricing and Return Policies for Perishable Commodities," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 4(2), pages 166-176.
- Lau, Hon-Shiang & Lau, Amy Hing-Ling, 1999. "Manufacturer's pricing strategy and return policy for a single-period commodity," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 116(2), pages 291-304, July.
- Hamilton Emmons & Stephen M. Gilbert, 1998. "Note. The Role of Returns Policies in Pricing and Inventory Decisions for Catalogue Goods," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 44(2), pages 276-283, February.
- Mantrala, Murali K. & Raman, Kalyan, 1999. "Demand uncertainty and supplier's returns policies for a multi-store style-good retailer," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 270-284, June.
- Porter, Michael E, 1974. "Consumer Behavior, Retailer Power and Market Performance in Consumer Goods Industries," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 56(4), pages 419-436, November.
- Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
- Hua, Zhongsheng & Li, Sijie & Liang, Liang, 2006. "Impact of demand uncertainty on supply chain cooperation of single-period products," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 268-284, April.
- Robert L. Winkler & Gary M. Roodman & Robert R. Britney, 1972. "The Determination of Partial Moments," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 19(3), pages 290-296, November.
- Khouja, Moutaz, 1999. "The single-period (news-vendor) problem: literature review and suggestions for future research," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 537-553, October.
- Gérard P. Cachon & Martin A. Lariviere, 2005. "Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(1), pages 30-44, January.
- James D. Dana, Jr. & Nicholas C. Petruzzi, 2001. "Note: The Newsvendor Model with Endogenous Demand," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 47(11), pages 1488-1497, November.
- Lohtia, Ritu & Xie, "Frank" Tian & Subramaniam, Ramesh, 2004. "Efficient consumer response in Japan: Industry concerns, current status, benefits, and barriers to implementation," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 306-311, March.
- Martin A. Lariviere & Evan L. Porteus, 2001. "Selling to the Newsvendor: An Analysis of Price-Only Contracts," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 3(4), pages 293-305, May.
- Ananth. V. Iyer & Mark E. Bergen, 1997. "Quick Response in Manufacturer-Retailer Channels," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 43(4), pages 559-570, April.
- Rajeev Kohli & Heungsoo Park, 1989. "A Cooperative Game Theory Model of Quantity Discounts," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 35(6), pages 693-707, June.
- Paul Dobson & Michael Waterson, 1999. "Retailer power: recent developments and policy implications," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 14(28), pages 133-164, 04.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jomega:v:36:y:2008:i:5:p:697-714. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.