Markov Equilibria in Discounted Stochastic Games
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- Duffie, Darrell, et al, 1994. "Stationary Markov Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 745-781, July.
- Parthasarathy, T & Sinha, S, 1989. "Existence of Stationary Equilibrium Strategies in Non-zero Sum Discounted Stochastic Games with Uncountable State Space and State-Independent Transitions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 18(2), pages 189-194.
- MERTENS, Jean-François, "undated".
"A measurable "measurable choice" theorem,"
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1665, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Mertens, J.-F., 1987. "A measurable “measurable choice” theorem," CORE Discussion Papers 1987049, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Harris, Christopher & Reny, Philip & Robson, Arthur, 1995. "The Existence of Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium in Continuous Games with Almost Perfect Information: A Case for Public Randomization," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(3), pages 507-544, May. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)