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Markov Equilibria in Discounted Stochastic Games

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  • Chakrabarti, Subir K.

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  • Chakrabarti, Subir K., 1999. "Markov Equilibria in Discounted Stochastic Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 294-327, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:85:y:1999:i:2:p:294-327
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Duffie, Darrell, et al, 1994. "Stationary Markov Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 745-781, July.
    2. Parthasarathy, T & Sinha, S, 1989. "Existence of Stationary Equilibrium Strategies in Non-zero Sum Discounted Stochastic Games with Uncountable State Space and State-Independent Transitions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 18(2), pages 189-194.
    3. Mertens, J.-F., 1987. "A measurable “measurable choice” theorem," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1987049, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    4. Mertens, J.-F. & Parthasarathy, T., 1991. "Nonzero-sum stochastic games," LIDAM Reprints CORE 912, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    5. A. S. Nowak & T. E. S. Raghavan, 1992. "Existence of Stationary Correlated Equilibria with Symmetric Information for Discounted Stochastic Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 17(3), pages 519-526, August.
    6. Harris, Christopher & Reny, Philip & Robson, Arthur, 1995. "The Existence of Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium in Continuous Games with Almost Perfect Information: A Case for Public Randomization," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(3), pages 507-544, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Frank H. Page & Myrna H. Wooders, 2009. "Endogenous Network Dynamics," Working Papers 2009.28, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    2. John Duggan, 2011. "Noisy Stochastic Games," RCER Working Papers 562, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
    3. Yehuda (John) Levy, 2012. "A Discounted Stochastic Game with No Stationary Equilibria: The Case of Absolutely Continuous Transitions," Discussion Paper Series dp612, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    4. Balbus, Łukasz & Reffett, Kevin & Woźny, Łukasz, 2014. "A constructive study of Markov equilibria in stochastic games with strategic complementarities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 815-840.
    5. Chakrabarti, Subir K., 2003. "Pure strategy Markov equilibrium in stochastic games with a continuum of players," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(7), pages 693-724, September.
    6. John Duggan, 2011. "Coalitional Bargaining Equilibria," Wallis Working Papers WP62, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
    7. Andrzej Nowak, 2007. "On stochastic games in economics," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 66(3), pages 513-530, December.
    8. Ulrich Doraszelski & Mark Satterthwaite, 2010. "Computable Markov‐perfect industry dynamics," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(2), pages 215-243, June.
    9. Subir K. Chakrabarti, 2021. "Stationary equilibrium in stochastic dynamic models: Semi-Markov strategies," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 9(2), pages 177-194, October.
    10. Duggan, John & Kalandrakis, Tasos, 2012. "Dynamic legislative policy making," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1653-1688.
    11. Bridgman, Benjamin, 2008. "Why are ethnically divided countries poor?," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 1-18, March.
    12. Yehuda (John) Levy, 2012. "A Discounted Stochastic Game with No Stationary Nash Equilibrium," Discussion Paper Series dp596r, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, revised May 2012.
    13. Horst, Ulrich, 2005. "Stationary equilibria in discounted stochastic games with weakly interacting players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 83-108, April.
    14. Barelli, Paulo & Duggan, John, 2014. "A note on semi-Markov perfect equilibria in discounted stochastic games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 596-604.
    15. Kalandrakis, Anastassios, 2004. "A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 116(2), pages 294-322, June.
    16. Bridgman, Benjamin, 2008. "Why are ethnically divided countries poor?," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 1-18, March.

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