Noncooperative Equilibrium and Chamberlinian Monopolistic Competition
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- Edward Cartwright & Myrna Wooders, 2005. "On Equilibrium in Pure Strategies in Games with Many Players," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0511, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- Wooders, Myrna & Edward Cartwright & Selten, Reinhard, 2002. "Social Conformity And Equilibrium In Pure Strategies In Games With Many Players," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 636, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
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- Romer, Paul M, 1990. "Endogenous Technological Change," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(5), pages 71-102, October.
- Lorenzo Rocco, 2007. "Anonymity in nonatomic games," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 54(2), pages 225-247, June.
- Gans, Joshua S., 1998. "Time Lags and Indicative Planning in a Dynamic Model of Industrialization," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 103-130, June.
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